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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COMPARATIVE
POLITICS: AN EXPLANATION FOR THE
EXTENSIVENESS OF AMERICAN
JUDICIAL REVIEW OFFERED FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMPARATIVE
GOVERNMENT
By John Peter Giraudo *
These are great questions, where great names militate against each
other, where reason isperplexed, and an appeal to authorities only
thickens the confusion.: for high and reverend authorities ift up
their heads on both sides, and there is no surefooting in the middfe.
This point is the great Serbian bog where armies whole have sunk.
Edmund Burke
Introduction
No more difficult and emotionally contentious debate exists in the
history of American constitutionalism than the debate which seeks to
define the proper role of the judiciary in American democracy. This is
understandable. It is a controversy which is central to the fabric of any
political system.
This note does not purport to add greatly to the continuing discus-
sion. It will not offer any new normative theory about the judicial
function. Nor will it reevaluate and reconstruct old theories. Rather,
this note will essay a more modest task. It will try to demonstrate why
the style of judicial review' is as it is-particularly in the United States.
o 1980 John Peter Giraudo.
* B.A., 1975, University of California, Berkeley; B. Phil., 1977, Oxford University;
member, third year class.
The author wishes to thank very much Dr. Geoffrey Marshall, Fellow of The Queen's
College, Oxford, for his great help in clarifying many of the ideas in this note.
1. The phrase 'Judicial review" will be used throughout this note in its generic rather
than its particular (American) sense unless it specifically refers to American judicial review.
As such the term means, as it does in English and Commonwealth practice, the ability of the
judiciary as a political body (and in contradistinction to other political bodies) to examine
the actions of legislators, to determine the meaning of these actions, and to ascertain their
validity according to "procedural" statutory rules governing what constitutes a legislative
act, rather than according to constitutional "substantive" rules determining whether such an
act is permissible. Judicial review in its generic sense is thus the power of the courts to
determine not whether an admitted act of the legislature collides with a superior constitu-
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To accomplish this end it will compare American judicial review with
the experience of judicial review in Britain, Canada and Australia, na-
tions arguably similar to the United States.2 By doing so, the note will
show how the peculiar institutional features of different political sys-
tems play a crucial part in making the judicial role found in individual
national contexts what it actually is.
3
The thesis that will be asserted is this: in Britain, Canada and
Australia, the institutional feature of "strong government" in the na-
ture of cabinet government4 makes judicial intervention in the policy-
making spheres of those nations unnecessary and unlikely. This ex-
plains the limited role of their courts. Conversely, inasmuch as Ameri-
can government is not cabinet government, and does not possess a
powerful law-making capacity, the judicial role is greater.' American
tional rule and is thus void (for that would be to determine the act's validity according to
some substantive rule), but instead whether a purported "enactment" is in fact an enact-
ment-e., in due form according to the procedural rules which govern and define what
constitutes a legislative "act." And if it is, what the words of such an enactment mean. See
G. MARSHALL, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH 13 (1962).
2. This study is limited to an analysis of judicial review in the United States, Britain,
Canada and Australia, although much of the discussion about judicial review in Canada
and Australia is applicable to the practice of judicial review in other states of the British
Commonwealth. See generaly E. MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW (4th ed. 1969). The au-
thor chose the latter three states for comparison with the former, partly in the interests of
space but more importantly because they share, as do few other nations, inter alia, language,
values, history and legal tradition. Moreover, their notions of liberal democracy and the
role of the judiciary in a system of government have been a model for emulation in other
parts of the world. See, e.g., T. FRANCK, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS (1968).
These nations are therefore appropriate polities for classification and study.
3. A familiarity with each political system, as well as with its historical and cultural
context, would aid attempts to draw comparisons. For such background information, see G.
CARTER, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (3d ed. 1972); J. MALLORY, THE
STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT (1971); J. MILLER & B. JINKS, AUSTRALIAN Gov-
ERNMENT AND POLITICS (4th ed. 1971); M. VILE, POLITICS IN THE U.S.A. (rev. ed. 1976).
4. For convenience, the convention of labelling the structure of government in Britain,
Canada and Australia as "cabinet government" will be adopted, even though there are fea-
tures unique to each of these cabinet government systems. In addition, the term "cabinet
government" will be used to distinguish these systems from what will be labelled "presiden-
tial-congressional government," the system of government practiced in the United States.
Although there is some danger of oversimplification and misconception by the use of such
labels, they are necessary to avoid even more clumsy terminology. H. HAZLiTT, A NEW
CONSTITUTION Now 40 n.1 (2d ed. 1974).
5. There are some scholars who have completely discarded the institutional approach
to the study of comparative politics, e.g., G. ALMOND & G. POWELL, COMPARATIVE POLIT-
ICS: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH (1966), ofjudicial review, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL
POLICY MAKING: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS (rev. ed. 1974), and of the compar-
ative study of judicial review, e.g., Hardisty, The Effect of Future Orientation on the American
Reformation of the English Judicial Method, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 523 (1979). Not all scholars,
though, believe it is a lost art. See, e.g., M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS 294-314 (1967).
courts must act to fill the void. This explains their adoption of non-
legal, political functions.
If this thesis is correct, admonitions to the American judiciary to
exercise "self-restraint" by those who desire a reduction in the role of
American courts may be misplaced. It directs attention to a symptom
rather than a cause of the problem. Moreover, in view of the fact that
most social reforms in the United States since the second world war
have been initiated by the judiciary, it leaves many unconvinced that
pressing public needs will be met if the courts withdraw from their
present concerns.
A sensible solution to the problem of expansive judicial power
cannot, therefore, be one which merely advances the cause of judicial
self-abstention without also offering a means of ensuring that current
court policy functions will be replaced. Such proposals are entirely
unagreeable to any intelligent observer of the effectiveness of American
government. The only satisfactory proposal will be one which in-
creases the capacity of American government to act, thereby making it
less necessary for courts to do so. Strengthening the capacity of gov-
ernment to legislate should reduce both the potential and justification
for extensive political judicial review, because it will rectify the numer-
ous imbalances and nonmajoritarian characteristics of the American
law-making process and thus make it a far more useful instrument of
national social reform than it presently is. Without such changes it
may be impossible to dampen the enthusiasm of groups with little po-
litical power for "government by judiciary."
Cabinet government, of course, is not a panacea for America's so-
cial ills. Events in Britain, Canada and Australia amply prove that.
Efficient machinery of government cannot replace good judgment on
the part of those who govern. But it does allow those with responsibil-
ity for government to more readily effect the plans they have for the
welfare of their charges. The political system in the United States,
through its inefficient procedures, precludes the implementation of
good or bad policies. The result is governmental impotence, even when
the public desperately requires some remedy. That is why the courts
act.
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I. Differences in the Scope and Style of Judicial Review in
the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia and
some Explanations for those Differences
A. The Scope of Judicial Review in the United Kingdom
The primary tenet of English constitutional law is the sovereignty
of Parliament.6 Stated succinctly by Albert Venn Dicey,7 the doyen of
English constitutional scholars,8 parliamentary sovereignty9 means:
6. Parliamentary sovereignty and legislative supremacy are not actually synonymous.
The term "parliamentary sovereignty" properly refers to the legal supremacy of the "King in
Parliament," the legal supremacy of an act which has been approved by the House of Com-
mons and the House of Lords and given the Royal Assent. A. DicEY. INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37-38 (8th ed. 1915). With, however, the
historical rise in importance of the House of Commons, the concommitant fall in the influ-
ence of the House of Lords (which under the Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13 and
the Parliament Act, 1949, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103 can only delay legislation approved by
the House of Commons) and the disuse by convention of the Royal Prerogative to veto
parliamentary legislation, the House of Commons, the popular legislature, is in practice "le-
gally" sovereign. See C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS
SUPREMACY 103-05, 357 n.1 (1910); cf G. MARSHALL & G. MOODIE, SOME PROBLEMS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 15-16 (rev. 5th ed. 1971).
7. Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922), Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford
(1882-1909), has been indisputably the most influential English constitutional lawyer and
scholar in this century. His exposition of theories of parliamentary sovereignty and the disu-
tility of written guarantees of civil liberties in INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, and LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW &
PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2d ed. 1917), are mon-
umental works which have had enormous influence on generations of constitutional lawyers,
scholars and judges in Britain and the Commonwealth. See note 92 infra. His ideas stand
in direct rebuttle to some prevailing American notions of constitutionalism and are thus
thought-provoking.
8. Although there is no single written document labelled the "British Constitution," it
is not incorrect to state that there is a British constitution consisting of statutes and cases
which, when taken together with various conventions, delineate the structure of British gov-
ernment, define the rights of Englishmen and specify the limits of governmental power. For
a historical description of English constitutional law, see generally F. MAXITLAND, THE CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1968). For a discussion of the liberties secured and
enforceable under the British constitution, see generally A. DENNING, FREEDOM UNDER THE
LAW (1949).
9. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was not always a characteristic of Eng-
lish legal theory. Compare the view of Lord Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646,
652 (1610) ("And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will...
controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an
Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void .. ") with
that of Sir William Blackstone in 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 160-61 ("The power
and jurisdiction of parliament. . . is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be con-
fined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. . .. It hath sovereign and uncontrol-
lable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing,
reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesi-
astical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that
1140
First, [t]here is no law which Parliament cannot change ....
Secondly, [t]here is under the English constitution no marked or
clear distinction between laws which are not fundamental or con-
stitutional and laws which are fundamental or constitu-
tional ...
Thirdly [t]here does not exist in any part of the British Empire
any person or body of persons, executive, legislative or judicial,
which can pronounce void any enactment passed by the British
Parliament on the ground of such enactment being opposed to
the constitution, or on any ground whatever, except, of course, its
being repealed by Parliament.' 0
It follows therefore from Dicey's definition of parliamentary sover-
eignty that "[j]udicial legislation is. . . subordinate legislation, carried
on with the assent and subject to the supervision of Parliament."' "I
Owing to this constitutional precept, the only permissible method
of judicial review which has developed in the United Kingdom has
been that of "judicial braking" 2through the operation of the ultra vires
doctrine.
The wider powers of the courts to review governmental action
start with the doctrine of ultra vires. Public authorities and offi-
cials must act within the powers the law allows them. If they take
on unauthorised functions, they are acting beyond their powers
(ultra vires), and the courts can intervene to stop the illegal ac-
tion. . . . Judicial review is thus first and foremost a matter of
statutory interpretation to make sure that the authority given by
Parliament to a public body is not exceeded.' 3
In reviewing parliamentary legislation, English courts are not permit-
ted to veto statutes. They can only decide whether action taken by
public officers under the authority of a statute goes beyond what that
statute allows. If it does, the action is ultra vires the statute and prohib-
absolute despotic power which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by
the constitution of these kingdoms."). By the nineteenth century, Blackstone's view pre-
vailed. See C. MCILWAIN, supra note 6.
10. A. DICEY, supra note 6, at 83-87.
11. Id. at 58.
12. E. MCWHNNEY, supra note 2, at 13.
13. THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF BRITAIN 35 (1976).
The execution of Charles I in 1649 brought an end to the prolonged struggle between
King and Parliament. F. MAITLAND, u.pra note 8, at 300. The result was Parliament's
complete victory over the forces of the Crown. Id. at 301-02. Thence forward, all officers of
the Crown were made amenable to Parliament's laws. S. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 4-6 (3d ed. 1973). Thus, the English notion of rule of law and due
process of law means executive action done according to Parliament's laws, not, as in present
American theory, done according to constitutional law. See id. at 5, 34. Since it is the
arbitrary action of the King's servants which is subject to the rule of law, the ultra vires
doctrine has had its most extensive application in administrative regulation. See generally
H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 1977).
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ited.14 This way English judges are able to apply brakes to executive
action. They are able to halt the exercise of public power at least until
Parliament enacts legislation overriding their judgments.'5
B. The Scope of Judicial Review in Canada and Australia
The nations of the British Commonwealth inherited Dicey's view
of parliamentary power with their independence from England. This
inheritance did not, however, carry into the Commonwealth an entirely
Dicean view of the judicial function. By a curious quirk of history the
judicial function in Canada and Australia is not the same as in Great
Britain.'6 It is not completely subordinated to the judicial function.
This development arose historically in the following way. The Cana-
dian and Australian constitutions are enactments of the English Parlia-
ment.'7 This means that they derive their existence from an external
legal system-the English legal system.' 8 They are thus incapable of
being repealed or modified by the legislatures created by those enact-
ments.' 9 As such they stand above ordinary legislation,20 as do "higher
14. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 12.
15. For some recent examples of English courts exercising judicial review by means of
the ultra vires doctrine to thwart the designs of British cabinet ministers, see Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Department of Trade, [1977] 2 All E.R. 182 (where the Court of Appeal held that
section 3(l)-(2) of the Civil Aviation Act of 1971 did not allow the Minister of Trade to
revoke a license given to the appellant to begin "low cost" passenger air service to the
United States); Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1977] 1 All E.R. 696 (where the
Court of Appeal held that section 68 of the Post Office Act of 1953 entitled the appellant to
apply for declaratory relief against impending union action without the consent of the Attor-
ney General); Secretary of State for Educ. and Science v. Tameside, [1476] 3 All E.R. 665
(where the House of Lords held that section 68 of the Education Act of 1944 did not em-
power the Minister of Education to order a local education authority against its wishes to
implement a scheme of open non-selective admission to the local authority's schools unless
its refusal was unreasonable).
16. In the Commonwealth, as in Britain, parliamentary sovereignty does not mean leg-
islative supremacy, but rather the Queen-in-Parliament or, with respect to dominion states,
the Governor-General-in-Parliament. In Canada and Australia, Governors-General repre-
sent the Queen and exercise Her functions. See note 6 supra and note 19 infra.
17. The Canadian constitution is the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.
3; the Australian constitution is the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63
& 64 Vict., c. 12. The Canadian constitution, as amended, is reprinted in A. ABEL & J.
LASKIN, LASKIN'S CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 903-46 (rev. 4th ed. 1975). The Aus-
tralian Constitution, as amended, is reprinted in R. LUMB & K. RYAN, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ANNOTATED xxxiii-lvi (2d ed. 1977).
18. Id.
19. In the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, the British government relin-
quished its right to legislate for Dominion states without their permission. Some constitu-
tional debate remains, however, as to the effect of section 2 of that Act, which in part reads,
"the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend
any such [British] Act, order, rule, or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the
Dominion." If this language means that Dominion Parliaments can repeal or amend their
constituent acts, then the Dominion Parliaments would be sovereign. The various Imperial
law" documents like the United States Constitution.2 This fact, alone
of course, did not lead Canadian and Australian judges to exercise ju-
dicial review in the same manner as American judges.22 But since it
did not prevent this possibility from transpiring, judicial review of the
American kind came about giving Canadian and Australian judges the
power to veto legislation.'
During the days of colonial rule by Great Britain final appeal from
Canadian and Australian courts was to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council.24 Situated in London, and composed almost exclusively
of English and Scottish judges, it had the ultimate power of review of
the constituent acts of Canada and Australia.25 In discharging its re-
sponsibilities, the Privy Council never perceived its role as being that of
a constitutional court of last resort with authority for making "politi-
cal" judgments through the interpretation of a "fundamental" docu-
ment.26 But owing to the nature of the Canadian and Australian
constitutions, and the Privy Council's approach to reviewing them, the
Council fell into just such a role. The Council treated the constituent
acts of Canada and Australia as if they were mere English statutes.27
Conferences held between Britain and Dominion states in preparation for this legislation
indicate, perhaps, that it does not. See G. MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 76-86. In any event,
neither the Canadian nor the Australian government has invoked this section to amend its
constitution. See A. ABEL & J. LASKIN, supra note 17, at 92 and R. LUMB & K. RYAN, supra
note 17, at 382-83.





25. "The Judicial Committee is a statutory body established in 1833 by an Act of 3 & 4
Will. 4, c. 41, entitled an Act for the better Administration of Justice in His Majesty's Privy
Council. . . .The Act. . .provides for the formation of a Committee of His Majesty's
Privy Council . . .and enacts that 'all appeals or complaints in the nature of appeals
whatever, which either by virtue of this Act or of any law, statute or custom may be brought
before His Majesty in Council from the order of any Court or judge should thereafter be
referred by His Majesty to, and heard by, the Judicial Committee, as established by the Act,
who should make a report or recommendation to His Majesty in Council for his decision
thereon, the nature of such report or recommendation being always stated in open
Court. . . .It is clear that the Committee is regarded in the Act as a judicial body or Court,
though all it can do is to report or recommend to His Majesty in Council, by whom alone the
Order in Council which is made to give effect to the report of the Committee is made.
"But according to constitutional convention it is unknown and unthinkable that His
Majesty in Council should not give effect to the report of the Judicial Committee, who are
thus in truth an appellate Court of law, to which by the statute of 1833 all appeals within
their purview are referred." British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500, 510. Seegen-
eraly E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 49-60.
26. See notes 27-30 infra. See generally E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 49-60.
27. Although the Canadian and Australian constituent acts were "constitutional" rather
than statutory documents, the Privy Council always interpreted the documents as if they
were English statutes: "Thus Lord Halsbury L.C., in Webb v. Outrim, [1907] A.C. 81,
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In this way the Council hoped to employ Dicey's theory of parliamen-
tary sovereignty and avoid becoming an un-English-like court.28 But
in treating them like English statutes the Privy Council naturally made
them subject to the ultra vires doctrine,29 the same doctrine which ap-
plied to all English statutes. As a result, if any Canadian or Australian
law went beyond the limits placed on a Canadian or Australian govern-
ment's law-making powers by the applicable constituent act, it could be
annulled.3° This outcome, of course, was totally unlike any result pos-
sible in an ordinary English court.3' It enabled the Privy Council to
render judicial decisions in the guise of statutory interpretation which
invalidated legislation.32
English constitutional theory subordinated the judicial role to the
legislative role in the United Kingdom. 3 By a peculiar historical de-
velopment, however, it produced the reverse situation in the Common-
wealth.34 It made the scope of judicial review practiced by the Privy
Council and later by its successors, the Canadian Supreme Court and
the High Court of Australia 35 similar to the scope of judicial review in
seemed disposed to challenge the notion that there could be such a thing as an 'unconstitu-
tional' act of a Dominion or colonial legislature, once that act had been assented to by the
Crown. During the argument in Webb v. Outrim, Lord Halsbury, in reply to counsel's con-
tention that a law was ultra vires, observed: 'That is a novelty to me. I thought an Act of
Parliament was an Act of Parliament and you cannot go beyond it .... I do not know what
an unconstitutional act means."' E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 59 n.24.
28. For examples of the Privy Council's method of interpretation, see Attorney-General
for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.), and Attorney-General
for Australia v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., [1914] A.C. 237. The failure to distinguish
between constitutional and statutory documents had far-reaching consequences for the style
of judicial review followed in Australia and Canada when appeals to the Privy Council
ended. See notes 39-62 and accompanying text infra. See also T. FRANCK, supra note 2, at
138-40.
29. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 12-14.
30. Id.
31. See note 28 supra.
32. For examples of Australian decisions, see note 274 infra. For examples of Canadian
cases, see Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 64 (where the Canadian Supreme
Court held that the City of Quebec could not bar Jehovah's Witnesses from distributing
leaflets on the streets of Quebec, pursuant to legislation enacted by the Quebec legislature,
because section 91 of the British North America Act, 1897, note 17 infra, did not permit
provincial legislatures to legislate to restrict freedom of religion); Attorney-General for
Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Ass'n, 19 D.L.R.3d 169 (1971) (where the Canadian
Supreme Court held that a Manitoba law regulating the importation of eggs was designed to
restrict the free flow of trade among the provinces and hence was not a power given to
provincial legislatures by section 91 of the British North America Act. See note 17 supra.
33. See notes 6-15 and accompanying text supra.
34. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text sufpra.
35. Appeals to the Privy Council from the Canadian Supreme Court were abolished in
1949 by the Supreme Court Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 22. As a result of legislation by
the Australian Parliament in 1968 and 1975, appeals to the Privy Council from the Austra-
lian High Court have also been, in effect, abolished. See R. LUMOB & K. RYAN, supra note
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C. The Style of Judicial Review in Britain, Canada and Australia
The historical evolution of Canadian and Australian judicial re-
view in theory has given judges in Canada and Australia considerable
freedom to substitute their own personal opinion of proper public pol-
icy in place of the views of their nations' legislators. This much has
already been explained. But the actual practice of judicial review in
Canada and Australia is not at all consistent with the theory.37 It re-
flects an extreme reluctance on the part of Canadian and Australian
judges to exercise "dynamic," "activist" judicial review.38 This reluc-
tance is demonstrated most dramatically by the style of judicial review
practiced by Canadian and Australian judges.
Like English jurists, Canadian and Australian judges follow a style
of judicial review which is highly "legalistic." It focuses on literal con-
struction of legal rules and their syllogistic analysis.40 They therefore
eschew the interest-balancing approach common to American adjudi-
cation.4' In their view such an approach is a political one. 2 It is not
the strictly legal approach which judges should follow. Lord Jowett
described the proper judicial function in this way:
[T]he problem is not to consider what social and political condi-
tions of today require; that is to confuse the task of the lawyer
-with the task of the legislator.
It is quite possible that the law has produced a result which
does not accord with the requirements of today. If so, put it right
by legislation, but do not expect every lawyer. . . to act as Lord
Mansfield did, and decide what the law ought to be. He is far
better employed if he puts himself to the much simpler task of
deciding what the law is.43
17, at 260. But even prior to this legislation, appeals to the Privy Council from the Austra-
lian High Court concerning questions of the limits of the constitutional powers of the Com-
monwealth or its states never existed as of right. They could be taken only be leave of the
High Court when it certified that the question was one which ought to be determined by Her
Majesty in Council-in effect the Privy Council. Id. at 257.
36. See note 273 and accompanying text infra.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 14, 60.
40. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 16-17.
41. Id.
42. For a synoptic analysis of "positivist" and "realist" legal philosophies which under-
lie and greatly influence English and American styles of judicial review, see S. BENN & R.
PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 72-87 (1975). For a more de-
tailed discussion, see G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 292-787 (1973).
43. Fullagar, Liabilities for Representations at Common Law, 25 AUSTL. L.J. 278, 296
(1951) (quoting Address by Viscount Jowitt to the Seventh Legal Convention of the Law
Council of Australia (Aug. 13, 1951)).
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The English, Canadian and Australian judge, therefore, only ap-
plies the law. He does not create it. At least he thinks so. This view of
the judicial function has placed severe restrictions on the judge's discre-
tion in making decisions.' For example, it has limited the judge's ac-
cess to information useful in reaching a judgment. Specifically, it does
not permit a judge
to consider the parliamentary history or the speeches in debates
in the House. . . as a guide to the meaning of contested legisla-
tion. . . [or] to allow counsel to refer to legal periodicals as au-
thorities. .. [or] to consider these social and economic materials
with which the United States Supreme Court has become famil-
iar since the Brandeis Brief was first employed .... 11
Nor does it permit the English and Commonwealth judge to discard
judicial precedents. In fact, it commands a very rigid adherence to the
doctrine of stare decisis. Curiously, this fidelity to precedent may even
be stronger in Canada and Australia than in Britain. If so, it has hap-
pened almost imperceptively. For many years the English House of
Lords was formally and absolutely bound by the rules of decision in
their previous cases even if the application of those rules produced un-
JUst consequences.46 The Privy Council, while not actually obliged to
fllow precedent (either its own or that of other English courts), never-
theless did so.47 It thus vastly influenced the practice of the Canadian
Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia.48 So even though in
recent years the House of Lords has relaxed somewhat its attitude to
the doctrine of stare decisis,49this liberalization of policy has not yet
44. See E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 14-18.
45. Id. at 16-17.
46. The rule that the House of Lords is absolutely bound by its former decisions was
established in London St. Tramways Co. v. London County Council, 11898] A.C. 375. In
1966, the House of Lords relaxed the rule somewhat: "Their Lordships ... propose, there-
fore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as
normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so." Prac-
tice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.
47. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 17 n.29.
48. After appeals to the Privy Council ended, the Canadian Supreme Court reaffirmed
the London Tramways principle, see note 46 supra, in Woods Mfg. Co. v. The King, [1951] 2
D.L.R. 465. See also D. SMILEY, CANADA IN QUESTION: FEDERALISM IN THE SEVENTIES 24
(2d ed. 1976). On the other hand, the Australian High Court had no need to reaffirm the
rule because it had always followed it, albeit with a qualification: the High Court would
overturn a precedent if it considered it to be "manifestly wrong." E.g., Attorney-General for
New South Wales v. Perpetual Trustee Co. (Ltd.), 85 C.L.R. 237 (1952). "On one notable
occasion, [however]. . . the High Court of Australia, in deference to this rule, felt bound to
follow a decision it had given in an earlier, more experimental period of its history, even
though the individual High Court judges felt that that decision was wrong; at the same time,
however, the High Court judges expressed the hope that the Privy Council would overrule
the earlier decision when the present case went to it on appeal, and this in fact the Privy
Council obligingly did." E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 17-18.
49. See note 46 supra.
greatly weakened the persuasiveness of precedents in either Canada or
Australia." Precedent is still enormously more influential there than in
the United States, and possibly even than in England. To the extent
stare decisis is followed, it directly reduces the ability of Canadian and
Australian judges to create new legal principles by judicial decision.
The exercise of such judicial self-discipline by English, Canadian
and Australian judges follows logically from their preconceived notions
of what it means to be a judge. Their role, as they conceive it, is limited
to the application of prior legal rules, be they legislative rules or com-
mon law rules." They therefore focus their efforts on interpreting
words, on discovering what meaning the words embodied in statutes
and common law convey to the ordinary readers of English.5" They do
not find it enlightening to seek the intent of the legislators who wrote
the legislation or the motives of the ancient common law judges who
first promulgated the common law.53 In their view to look behind the
words of legislators or judges by inquiring into their thoughts and val-
ues would be an unseemly political task, one fraught with the dangers
ofjudicial manipulation.54 It would not aid them in making grammati-
cal sense of the legislation or the precedent. This then explains why the
use of social and economic statistics in judicial decision-making is for
them simply irrelevant.55 By the same theory of jurisprudence they jus-
tify their attachment to the doctrine of stare decisis. According to Lord
Devlin, "[t]he theory that supports the rule must. . . be the theory that
judges do not make the law but only declare it. . . .Clearly this per-
mits no change in the law once it has been revealed and pronounced.
' 56
Since this is so, judges are simply not allowed to substitute their opin-
ions for those of legislators or earlier judges. They can only declare
what legislators and judges have said the law is. Once they have done
so, they have stated forever (or until the legislature intervenes to
50. See note 48 supra.
51. See G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, 73-79 (1971).
52. Id. at 75.
53. Id. at 74-76.
54. Id. at 78.
55. Id. at 74-75.
56. P. DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING, 21-22 (1962). Lord Devlin went on to state
that "it is not, I think, too strong a sense of pride that has led the House of Lords to rely on
its infallibility; it is the simple acceptance of the constitutional principle that the judiciary
has only a limited right to make law. In the House of Lords the judicial process exhausts
itself. The law that is there pronounced may not even at the time be the best rule for the
needs of society that could be devised; and certainly, if it is, it will not always remain so. But
it is the best that can be produced by development and without abrupt change. Change is
for the legislature. .. .because in a democracy it is for the people to decide whether a law
is good or bad, serviceable to them or not. .. .The House of Lords does not take pride in
the fiction of its infallibility; it takes refuge in it." Id.
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change the law) what the law means. No reversal of precedent is there-
fore possible.
This highly "legalistic" style ofjudicial review is the contemporary
practice of English, Canadian and Australian judges.5 7 It is intention-
ally designed to limit their exercise of judicial power, and to place the
primary burden for legal change on the political branches.58 The style
is not used by these judges as a means of abdicating responsibility for
national reforms. 9 Rather, their use of this style reflects a recognition
on their part of the limited right and ability they have as judges to
provide such reforms. 60 Sir Owen Dixon, upon his elevation to Chief
Justice of the High Court of Australia, made this very clear when he
rebuked critics of his court's approach to judicial review6' by saying:
"It may be that the Court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I
should be sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other safe
guide to judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and complete
legalism.162 This commitment to "complete legalism" has made the
Canadian and Australian courts in particular very reticent to use the
power they possess. They have not exploited their power to undertake
intensive judicial review.
D. The Scope and Style of Judicial Review in the United States
American judicial review is in large part the product of the histori-
cal acceptance and evolution in the United States of Chief Justice John
Marshall's constitutional theory. In the case of Marburv v. Madison
63
he declared that the American Constitution was fundamental law, and
that its interpretation was solely within the competence of the judici-
ary.64 Although neither assertion was logically necessary.,65 or even im-
57. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
58. See P. DEVLIN, supra note 56, at 1-27.
59. Id. at 23.
60. Id. at 23-25.
61. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 79.
62. 26 AUSTL. L.J. 2, 6 (1952) (cited in E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 79). This view
was recently repeated by the present Chief Justice of the High Court, Chief Justice Barwick,
when he said: "The only true guide and the only course which can produce stability in
constitutional law is to read the language of the Constitution itself, no doubt generously and
not pedantically, but as a whole: and to find its meaning by legal reasoning." Attorney-
General for Australia v. Commonwealth of Australia, 7 Austl. L.R. 593, 600 (1975). It was
expressed more bluntly by Canadian Chief Justice Taylor of the Manitoba Court of Appeals
when he said: "I am not here to dispense justice. I am here to dispose of this case according
to law. Whether this is or is not justice is a question for the legislature to determine."
Cavalluzzo, Judicial Review and the Bill of Ri'ghts: Drybones and its Aftermath, 9 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 511, 517 (1971). Compare this view with the American one expressed in note 87
infra.
63. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
64. Id. at 177.
65. "[I]n theory, all the organs of the government are of equal capacity; or, if not equal,
mediately accepted by the nation, his view is today unassailable.
History has settled the matter.66
In Marshall's view, the judiciary was empowered to have the last
word as to the propriety of governmental actions. This naturally estab-
lished a degree of prominence and power for the American judiciary
not given to English courts,67and not yet claimed by the highest courts
of Canada and Australia.6 This capacity for judicial review, however,
did not empower the American courts to rule on every social issue
brought before them. But since it did not logically preclude such an
approach, the historical development of Marshall's theory of judicial
review, particularly during this century, and most noticeably since the
second world war has given the American judiciary the power to re-
solve a large number of essentially social disputes which in other coun-
tries are resolved by the political branches.69 Led by the United States
Supreme Court, the judicial role in the American political system ex-
panded, on the one hand, by means of the interpretation of general
clauses of the Constitution,7" and on the other, by a lowering of the
traditional procedural barriers to judicial review of legislation.71 The
effect was to enlarge synergistically the sphere of social conflicts within
the American polity, not only subject to judicial review, but also, as a
result of Marshall's theory, to the final judgment of the courts.72 Ac-
cordingly, the scope of American judicial review is much broader and
far more important than that exercised by British, Canadian or Austra-
lian courts.
each must be supposed to have superior capacity only for those things which peculiarly
belong to it; and as legislation peculiarly involves the consideration of those limitations
which are put on the law making power and the interpretation of the laws when made,
involves only the construction of the laws themselves, it follows, that the construction of the
constitution, in this particular, belongs to the legislature, which ought, therefore, to be taken
to have superior capacity to judge of the constitutionality of its own acts." Eakin v. Raub,
12 Serg. & Rawl. 330, 350 (Pa. 1825).
66. "Historical accident and bad logic may explain the inception of judicial review, but
by now the American nation has lived with the consequences for more than 150 years." R.
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 17 (1960).
67. See notes 6-15 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 16-36 and accompanying text supra.
69. See generally D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-21 (The Brook-
ings Institution, (1977).
70. "Some of the changes, but not all, result from reading into the generalities of the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses notions of wise and fundamental policy which
are not even faintly suggested by the words of the Constitution, and which lack substantial
support in other conventional sources of law." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 100 (1976).
71. See id. at 108 (e.g., standing, political questions, declaratory judgments and class
actions).
72. See generally A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968). See also notes 205-07 and accompanying text infra.
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Given the wide reach of American judicial review, it is not surpris-
ing to find that courts in the United States actively occupy a role fully
commensurate with that scope. Unlike Canadian or Australian courts,
the American judiciary has seldom consciously foregone its ability to
make far-reaching decisions.7 3 Quite to the contrary, the judiciary has
been the principal instrument of social change in the United States
since the second world war.74 This has of necessity created a style of
judicial review which is quintessentially pragmatic in approach. In-
deed it has virtually eliminated even the pretense of "legalism."
American judges fully admit that they "make" law, and, (to the
horror of the followers of English jurisprudence), that it is their proper
function to do so. 76 In the view of many American judges, a pragmatic
approach is required because:
Though policy considerations have . . . very clearly intruded
into the courts' decision-making, they have all too frequently en-
tered by the back door to operate as "inarticulate major prem-
ises" only for the courts' ultimate holdings. The essential
weakness of the [English] position in this respect has been the
failure to recognize that it is not a choice between judicial policy-
making and absence of judicial policy-making; but between pol-
icy-making based on a full and open canvasing of alternative
lines of action and policy-making in the dark.7 7
Consonant with a philosophy which commands them to make a full
inquiry into policy alternatives, American judges behave a great deal
like legislators. They frequently use social and economic information,
as well as legislative historical materials to assist them in reaching a
decision.78 More often than not they are unpersuaded by precedent.79
In their view, common law judges existed not only in medieval times.8 0
Their successors are today as much common law judges as were the
jurists of the Curia Regis.' This realization provides American judges
73. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (criminal procedure); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (reapportionment); BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUC., 349 U.S. 294
(1955) (desegregation). Inspired by these decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
American state supreme courts have become bolder in discarding their claims of deference
to the legislative will. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532
P.2d 1226 (1975) (the adoption of comparative negligence by judicial decision); Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (the annulment of
governmental and charitable immunities to suit).
74. See generally note 72 supra.
75. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 238.
76. Id See also E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 3-80 (1962).
77. E. McWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 29-30.
78. Id.
79. See note 73 supra.
80. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 639-40, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974).
81. Id See also State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969) (Black-
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with the justification for making subjective decisions by "weighing and
balancing" interests.82 It encourages them to focus on the normative
aspects of decisions and not on how those decisions are made. In short,
it makes them result oriented.83
Such a free-wheeling pragmatic style of judicial review is very dif-
ferent from the legalistic one practiced by English and Commonwealth
judges.84 It is not designed to limit the role of American judges, but to
expand it. It thus places the onus of legal reform on the courts.8 5 It is
not surprising, then, to find that American judges share the work of
creating social change with their executive and legislative comrades.
86
E. Some Reasons Commonly Given for the Differences in the Style of
Judicial Review Practiced by American, British, Canadian
and Australian Courts
A comparison of the style of judicial review practiced by English,
Canadian and Australian courts, with the approach taken by American
courts reveals some extraordinarily large differences. 87 The former ju-
stone's notion of custom was used to create an easement in land which neither statute nor
precedent could create).
82. McWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 29-30.
83. See Forrester, 4re We Readyfor Truth in Judging? 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
84. Professor Sanford Kadish feels that it is in fact this overtly "political" style which
has made the United States Supreme Court so vulnerable to allegations that it is usurping
legislative powers. Kadish, Judicial Review in the United States Supreme Court and the High
Court of,4ustralia (Part II), 37 TEX. L. RE. 133, 167-68 (1958). By comparison, he notes
that the Australian High Court has been relatively free from such accusations. Id. Accord-
ing to Professor Kadish, the High Court has avoided widespread criticism, not because it has
not rendered controversial judgments, for it has made a number of them, see notes 274-75
infra, but because when it has done so, it has been extremely careful to couch its analysis of
the legal issues and its reasons for the decision in the mechanistic, "legalistic" manner it is
accustomed to use. Id. The High Court has thus been far better able to "look" like a court
than has the Supreme Court, and has thus been less open to attack. Id.
85. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
86. Id. "[T]he method and criteria of constitutional adjudication advanced by Chief
Justice Dixon [of the Australian High Court, see notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra],
would find little acceptance in the contemporary Supreme Court. In the United States "le-
galistic" has become an opprobrious adjective. Fixed concepts and logical categories have
come to be regarded as chimera concealing the true springs of motivation of decision mak-
ing .... Strictly legalistic techniques ... [are] subordinated in favor of a sophisticated use
of the world of fact[,] of sociology, economics, political theory and history." Kadish, supra
note 84, at 135-36. As another commentator recounted: "A century ago a great American
judge, Chancellor Kent, in a personal letter explained his method of arriving at a decision.
He first made himself 'master of the facts.' Then (he wrote) 'I saw where justice lay, and the
moral sense decided the court half the time; I then sat down to search the authorities .... I
might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I almost alwaysfoundprinc#iles
suited to my view of the case .... ' G. CHRISTIE, supra note 42, at 700 n.109 (italics in the
original).
87. The magnitude of constitutional adjudication in the United States is best seen by
comparing it with that found in Canada and Australia.
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diciaries perform a much less sizable role in their respective political
systems than do the latter."8 Why is this so? Canadian and Australian
courts possess nearly the same ambit ofjudicial power as do American
courts.
Scholars of comparative judicial review usually give three expla-
nations for the relative extensiveness of American judicial review.
First, constitutional theory and political development in the four na-
1903-1965 1948-1968 1949-1971
CANADIAN
AUSTRALIAN U.S. SUPREME SUPREME
HIGH COURT COURT COURT
Federal laws held invalid in whole or in
part 100 831 1*
Federal laws held valid 240 940 17
Percent of Federal laws held invalid 34.0% 46.9% 5.3%
State laws held invalid in whole or in part 70 182** 15
State laws held valid 90 75** 22
Percent of State laws held invalid 43.8% 72.4%** 41.0%
Total laws held invalid in whole or in part 170 1013** 16
Total laws held valid 330 1015** 39
Percent of total laws held invalid 34.0% 49.9%** 29.1%
* Regina v. Drybones is not included. See note 198 infra.
** includes only state criminal law totals.
A comparison of the figures reveals that the United States Supreme Court has considered
the validity of more than five times as many public laws, and has held more than eight times
as many of them invalid in twenty years as has the Australian High Court in sixty years.
When its work is compared to the work of the Canadian Supreme Court the figures magnify
beyond sensible comparison the enormous role played by the United States Supreme Court
in the American political system. The figures in the table with respect to the United States,
Australia and Canada are found in P. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT, 339-41
(1972), G. SAWYER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM IN THE COURTS, 80 (1967) and Weiler, The
Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism, U. OF TORONTO L.J. 307, 361 nn. 102-
04 (1973), respectively.
These comparisons should no doubt be made with caution. But even if one allows the
differences in jurisdictional ambit to account for the vast disparity in total constitutional
adjudication, one cannot escape the import of the percentage figures. Just over a quarter of
the Canadian laws, and a third of the Australian laws have been held invalid by the highest
courts in those countries, while in the United States nearly half of the federal and state laws
enacted between 1948 and 1968 have been annulled by the United States Supreme Court.
Thus the figures reveal in a startling manner the relative roles played by each judiciary in its
respective political system.
88. Id.
tions have been different.8 9 To justify their subservience to the legisla-
tive will, Canadian and Australian judges still profess allegiance to
Dicey's conceptiona of the judicial role.9" Indeed, they continue to do so
even in face of the fact that their parliaments are manifestly not sover-
eign in the way the English parliament is.9 Dicey's constitutionalism,
therefore, remains a powerful intellectual impediment to expansive Ca-
nadian and Australian judicial review. Through the media of legal ed-
ucation and experience it molds and colors the practices of Canadian
and Australian judges.92 In America, of course, Dicey's view of legisla-
tive sovereignty never took hold. Chief Justice Marshall's theory of
judicial power has reigned supreme.93 No similar theoretical obstacles
to active judicial review ever existed to block the advance of judicial
89. See notes 6-87 and accompanying text supra.
90. "The [Canadian Supreme] Court exercises judicial restraint largely because of its
acceptance of the concept of the supremacy of Parliament. . . ." Cheffins, The Supreme
Court of Canada: The Quiet Court in an Unquiet Country, 4 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 259, 263
(1966).
The Australian High Court, on the other hand, practices self-restraint in a more subtle
fashion. It does not avowedly exercise legislative deference by an adherence to Dicey's for-
mal logic of parliamentary sovereignty; in fact, it has been quite receptive to American con-
stitutional ideas. See, e.g., Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. I,
262-63 (1951) (Fullager, J., concurring) ("in our system the principle of Marbury v. Madison
• . . is accepted as axiomatic, modified in varying degree in various cases . . ."). Yet
notwithstanding such views, evidence of judicial review indicates that "[i]n construing an
enactment the constitutional validity of which is in issue, the [High] Court will not hold it to
be ultra vires unless the invalidity is clear beyond all doubt; the presumption is always in
favour of validity. . . ." W. WYNES, LEGISLATiVE, ExECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS IN
AUSTRALIA 34 (4th ed. 1970). Accord, R. LUMB & K. RYAN, supra note 17, at 19-23. Thus
Dicey's influence seems apparent.
91. See G. MARSHALL, supra note I, at 103-17; Lyon, The Central Fallacy of Canadian
Constitutional Law, 22 McGILL L.J. 40 (1976).
The Canadian government, by virtue of the British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949,
12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 81, was given power to amend the Canadian constitution in all matters
except certain broadly defined subjects, principally those concerning provincial government
powers and autonomy. Id. Amendment of these matters still requires a British statute. G.
MARSHALL, supra note I, at 88-90.
The Australian constitution cannot be amended by the Australian Commonwealth Par-
liament acting alone. The procedure for amendment is described in section 128 of the Com-
monwealth of Australia Constitution Act, and requires, inter alia, a referendum. R. LuMB &
K. RYAN, supra note 17, at Iv-lvi. Therefore, as C.H. Mcllwain put it: "When the referen-
dum really comes, the sovereignty of Parliament must go." quoted in G. MARSHALL, supra
note 1, at 103.
92. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 27-28. See also Cavalluzzo, supra note 62, at 513,
532. The influence of Dicey in the training of Canadian lawyers, judges and academics at
Canadian law schools has been pervasive. There is some suggestion, though, that the Eng-
lish Inns of Court are becoming less of a mecca for Canadian legal scholars than they once
were. Id. at 532. Indeed, the latest generation of Canadian legal scholars are apparently
pursuing graduate degrees at American law schools. Id.
93. See notes 64-72 and accompanying text supra.
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supremacy.
94
A second explanation for the comparative extensiveness of Ameri-
can judicial review lies with the nature of the judicial personnel of each
nation's judiciary. The character of the individuals chosen to be judges
has reenforced the divergent judicial styles.95 In the United States the
selection of judges has been a rather haphazard process. Numerous
members of the American bench have been "men of affairs," individu-
als with motley backgrounds.96 They have included large numbers
with political experience.97 By contrast, English, Canadian and Aus-
tralian judges are selected from a special barrister class of professional
litigators.98 They have often been the elite of the legal profession,
many of them eminent scholars.99 This difference in the make-up of
the judicial personnel has undoubtedly buttressed the pragmatic "polit-
ical" style of American judges, and the abstract "legalistic" style of
their English, Canadian and Australian counterparts. l0
A third reason for the larger level of American judicial review may
possibly be found in the dissimilar procedures and caseload of the Ca-
nadian, Australian and American high courts. For example, one Cana-
dian procedure obliges the Supreme Court of Canada to render
advisory opinions. 01 Since such cases do not deal with "real" issues
and conventional adversary procedures, but are judged in the abstract,
they may encourage that court to treat all cases similarly, and resolve
even real issues in a legalistic way. Another example points to the
greatly different jurisdictional caseloads handled by the three high
courts. In contrast to the United States Supreme Court, and despite
being federal states, both the Canadian Supreme Court and the Austra-
94. Id.
95. See generally E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 247-48. See also J. SCHMIDHAUSER,
THE SUPREME COURT: ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROCEDURES 30-62 (1960).
96. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 247.
97. See notes 95-96 supra.
98. "In a word, [Commonwealth judges] ... tend to view their role as being far more
strictly professional and so as imposing far more restraints of political prudence than do
their American counterparts. This is a direct consequence, and also a means of insuring the
maintenance, of the principle that the judges themselves should be legal professionals and
that strictly professional legal criteria should be uppermost in the search for candidates for
judicial office. The Commonwealth supreme courts, up to recent times, have generally been
free of the 'men of affairs' who have so largely staffed the United States Supreme Court since
the Roosevelt era." McWhinney, Constitutional Review in Canada and the Commonwealth
Countries, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 900, 904 (1974). See generally E. NEUMAN, THE HIGH COURT
OF AUSTRALIA A COLLECTIVE PORTRAIT, 1903-1972 at 83 (2d ed. 1973); Clark, Appointments
to the Bench, 30 CAN. B. REv. 28 (1952).
99. Id.
100. See E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 247-48. See also Kadish, supra note 84, at
160-62 for descriptions of how judicial appointments buttress "legalistic" and "pragmatic"
attitudes to judicial review.
101. CAN. REV. STAT., c. S. 19, S. 55 (1970).
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Han High Court preside over unitary court systems. 10 2 This makes
them the highest tribunals in their lands for private law matters.10 3 The
bulk of their legal work concerns problems of tort, contract, property,
etc. 104 As a result, "judicial constitution-making in Canada and Aus-
tralia has been a part time, more casual, less absorbing responsibil-
ity.' 05 In the United States the discretionary power given the United
States Supreme Court over its case load by the Judiciary Act of 1925,106
has permitted that Court to concentrate its attention exclusively on
public law matters. 107 This has made it politically conscious and at-
tuned to current events.0 8 And it has allowed the court to deliberately
plan its attempts at judicial legislation. 0 9 This ability has no doubt
increased the "political" character of American judicial review far be-
yond the everyday pursuits of Canadian and Australian judicial re-
view. 11
0
These three foregoing factors inescapably have influenced the
amount of judicial review practiced in Britain, Canada, Australia and
the United States. They may not be, though, the entire explanation for
the extensiveness of American judicial review. There is, perhaps, a
more persuasive reason.
II. An Institutional Explanation for the Differences in Judicial
Review Practiced by English, Canadian, Australian
and American Courts
A. An Institutional Reason Proposed
No proper understanding of the role of the judiciary in a system of
government is possible without an understanding of the political sys-
tem within which it operates."II Political institutions do not function in
a vacuum. The judiciary is no exception. On the contrary, the judici-
ary like all institutions interacts with other parts of the political system.
As Jeremy Bentham observed, "law is not made by judge alone, but by





106. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
107. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 235.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 248.
110. See notes 101-09 and accompanying text supra.
111. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
(1955). In Justice Jackson's opinion, "[n]o sound assessment of our Supreme Court can treat
it as an isolated, self-sustaining, or self-sufficient institution. It is a unit of a complex, inter-
dependent scheme of government from which it cannot be severed." Id. at 2.
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judge and company."' I2 Therefore, before one can adequately assess
any single law-making body, one must analyze the total law-making
apparatus of the political system."13
In analyzing the structure of the American, British, Canadian and
Australian political systems, it becomes apparent that American presi-
dential government is plagued by inherent institutional disabilities." 4
Self-frustrating mechanisms operate throughout the political system to
debilitate the American law-making process. So "weak" has been
American government that it has not been very responsive to public
demands for reforms nor very willing to shoulder voluntarily the re-
sponsibility of dealing with politically intractable social problems. This
impotence has kept it from governing properly, and from preventing
other parts of the political system-like the courts-from governing in
its stead.115
Elsewhere the situation has been different. In Britain, Canada and
Australia, the operation of cabinet government has been, by compari-
son, "strong" government. By centralizing and arterializing political
power, "cabinet government" has been able to provide political coordi-
nation, government control and national legislation in ways in which
American government cannot. Therefore, cabinet government in these
political systems has been the primary instrument of social reform, as
well as the principal deterrent to activist judicial policy-making. In the
United States the judiciary has found it necessary to fill the void in law-
making because the political branches could neither perform their
proper task nor prevent the courts from performing it. In Britain, Ca-
nada and Australia the courts have not found such gaping voids be-
cause the political branches there could assume a fuller legislative role.
Nor have they been inclined to regularly challenge the power of their
cabinet governments because the political branches would not tolerate
an usurpation of their work.
B. Comparative Constitutional Theory
1. United States
The institutional organization of government in the United States
is very different from its organization in Britain, Canada and Australia.
It should not be surprising, then, to find that the scope and style of
judicial review in the United States is also different. What may be sur-
prising, though, is the realization that this atypical American institu-
tional scheme of government fosters the difference.
112. Quotedin P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 78 (1949).
113. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMA KERS (1969) for a
study of comparative judicial review.
114. See notes 153-94 and accompanying text infra.
115. Id.
The American founding fathers greatly distrusted the potential po-
litical power of the Union government they were assembled to cre-
ate. "' They had experienced the misguided rule of what they believed
was an unrestrained sovereign, so they were committed to minimizing
the likelihood of tyrannical government in their new constitutional ar-
rangements. 1 7 Following the constitutional maxim of the separation
of powers with which they were familiar, the framers of the American
Constitution divided the political sovereign into three completely in-
dependent, co-equal agencies of government," 8 and pitted them
against each other so as to check and hinder their operations."I9 The
personnel of one branch was forbidden to perform the work of the
other branches. The functions of each branch, insofar as they inter-
fered with the autonomous functioning of other branches, were se-
verely circumscribed-Le., limited to impeding the other's work. 120 In
this manner, the framers reckoned, no one branch could overwhelm the
others by arrogating unto itself all political power.'
2 1
The authors of the American Constitution sincerely believed that
their scheme of institutional organization was the only means of avoid-
ing totalitarianism. 122 Indeed, they believed that their rather literal in-
terpretation of the doctrine of separated powers was the most
serviceable to the nation.2 3 Many American constitutional scholars
agree with them. 124 Indeed, consonant with the framers' casuistic
spirit, present day American constitutionalism suggests that the more
minutely one subdivides political power, and the more widely one dis-
perses it amongst government institutions and empowers each political
unit to block the work of all the others, the greater will be the obstacles
to coordinated political action, and therefore the greater the certainty
of a citizen's protection from arbitrary government. 125 As long as gov-
ernment is able to act only slowly and laboriously, then public safety is
maximized. 126 Government at all levels in the United States embodies
this idea; 27 it is designed to be difficult, not efficient.
128
116. C. BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDERALISTS 209 (rev. ed. 1964).
117. Id.
118. D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 20-24 (1975).
119. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
120. Id.
121. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison).
122. D. HUTCHISON, supra note 118, at 24.
123. Id.
124. See generaly SUBCOMM. ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, S. REP. No. 91-549, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
125. Id.
126. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
127. "Fortunately, the federal executive is not dispersed into its [sic] many elements as
the executive of each of our States is. The dispersion of our state executives runs from top to
bottom. The governor has no cabinet. The executive officers of state associated with him in
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2. Britain, Canada and Australia
The Canadian and Australian founding fathers (following the dic-
tates of English constitutional theorists) were seemingly less fearful of
the potential of government power than their American counter-
parts.'29 Unlike the American framers, the framers of the Australian
and Canadian constitutions had the advantage of witnessing and study-
ing the evolution and development of English constitutional arrange-
ments in the nineteenth century. 130 They were able therefore to
organize their government according to notions of the separation of
powers which had reached a greater degree of maturation.131 The the-
ory which underlies the British, Canadian and Australian institution of
cabinet government manifests a wholly different interpretation of the
meaning of separated powers than that underlying American constitu-
tional organization. 132 It emphasizes, not the division and diffusion of
political power, but its concentration and coordination.
33
Cabinet government operates in the following way:' 34 All political
power is initially consolidated in the legislature from whose member-
ship is subsequently drawn by internal election an executive manage-
ment board of government directors-styled the cabinet. The cabinet
collectively exercises executive power, but must secure all its proposals
through the legislature to which it must remain constantly responsi-
ble. 35 The cabinet is the visible locus of accumulated executive power.
But its ability to act hinges entirely on the legislature's confidence in
it. 136 A majority of the legislature must always support it.' 37 Since the
executive-cabinet is not only dependent on the legislature for its legisla-
tive program, but also (and perhaps more importantly) for its very
existence as the government of the nation, the cabinet system coercively
encourages executive-legislative cooperation and the coordination of
administration are elected as he is. Each refers his authority to particular statutes or particu-
lar clauses of the state constitution. Each is responsible politically to his constituents, the
voters of the State, and, legally, to the courts and their juries." WOODROW WILSON, CON-
STITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (1961).
128. 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
129. See R. MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 54-55
(1967).
130. Id. at 52-53.
131. See M. VILE, supra note 5, at 263-98.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See generally W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER POLITICAL
ESSAYS (1895); R. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (5th ed. 1970); S. ENCEL, CABI-
NET GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA (1962); I. JENNINGS, CABINET GOVERNMENT (3d ed.
1969).
135. I. JENNINGS, supra note 134, at 472-510.
136. Id.
137. Id.
law-making activities.' 38 Further, it is precisely because cabinet mem-
bers are members of both executive and legislative bodies and because
they are the visible expression of the majority's will that they are able
to accomplish successfully the task of central coordination and cooper-
ation.' 39 The cabinet is the vital link between the executive bureau-
cracy and the legislature-in Walter Bagehot's famous phrase, "[the]
hyphen which joins [the executive and the legislature and the] buckle
which fastens [them together]. ,, 40
At first glance to an American, cabinet government may seem to
violate the principles of separated powers. 141 It does not. As a method
of constitutional organization, cabinet government is as faithful to the
seminal ideas of western constitutionalism as the American scheme of
presidential-congressional government. 42 It adheres to the notions of
separated powers, albeit in a different way. In Britain, Canada and
Australia, there are three branches of government. 43 The personnel
and function of the judiciary are completely separate from those of the
other two branches.'" But the executive and legislature maintain only
a partial separation of personnel and functions. 145 They share some of
them. 146 Cabinet ministers are members both of the executive and leg-
islature: '41 they function as executive heads of bureaucratic depart-
ments, and as parliamentary legislators.' 48 Thus, although not all
political power is capable of being accumulated in the same hands (the
fundamental tenet of the doctrine of separated powers) 49 because not
all the members of the executive are members of the legislature, or vice
versa, a considerable amount of political power is concentrated in the
hands of a group of individuals-the cabinet-in the interests of ensur-
ing the cooperation of the executive and legislature and of coordinating
138. Id. at 59-89, 228-89, 472-510.
139. W. BAGEHOT, supra note 134, at 79; WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL Gov-
ERNMENT 92 (1956).
140. W. BAGEHOT, supra note 134, at 82.
141. See, e.g., Professor Hutchison's statement in D. HUTCHISON, supra note 118, at 24.
142. See D. Hutchison, supra note 118, at 24.
143. See generally M. VILE, supra note 5, at 14-20.
144. See generaly id. at 19, 212-37.
145. See generally id. at 18-19.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. R. MENZIES, supra note 129, at 54.
149. This maxim does not require each branch to be "wholly and entirely separate and
distinct, and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the other, in
the slightest degree. The true meaning is, that the whole power of one of these departments
should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the
other departments.. . ." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 393 (5th ed. M. Bigelow 1905). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J.
Madison); M. VIE, supra note 5, at 19.
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their activities. 5 ° Deviation from the doctrine of separated powers as
practiced in the United States is therefore merely one of degree.'"'
C. A Comparison of Cabinet Government and Presidential-
Congressional Government
1. The Nonmajoritarian Nature of the American Law-making Process
Law-making in the United States is an extremely intricate and ar-
duous procedure. Pitfalls for legislation are arrayed at every juncture
of the process, making legislation slow and its outcome uncertain. 52
This is the stark reality of American government.111 Less immediately
apparent, perhaps, is how highly nonmajoritarian this system actually
is.
The disruption of legislation is possible through deadlocks both
between the political branches and within them. 54 Not only is either
branch able to veto the work of the other, but within each branch nu-
merous, self-functioning political vortices are also able to do the
same. 5 5 The internal organization of the legislature, its procedures
and committee structure frustrate rather than coordinate law-mak-
ing. 5 6 So too does the internal operation of the executive department,
150. See M. VILE, supra note 5, at 212-38, 315-51.
151. The doctrine of the separation of powers is an ancient one. It is not an exclusively
American concept. Its expression in western governments takes various forms. The doctrine
in its purest form commands the complete separation of government agencies, functions and
personnel, and prohibits the interference of one with the other. M. VILE. supra note 5, at 14-
18. Consonant with this pure theory, the French constitution of 1791 explicitly denied the
judiciary any power of judicial veto over legislation. Id. at 188-89. Oliver Cromwell's In-
strument of Government (1653) did the same in establishing the interregnum Protectorate in
England. Id. at 47-48. And in the United States various colonial governments adhered to a
close approximation of the pure theory until the adoption of the Federal Constitution in
1789. Id. at 122, 133. The operation of the pure theory, however, made effective govern-
ment impossible. Thus, each nation which applied the theory found it necessary to compro-
mise the original idea to allow for a modicum of coordination among government agencies,
functions and personnel. Id. at 119-293. The results of those compromises are seen in the
present operation of presidential-congressional government and cabinet government. The
former emphasizes more separation and less coordination than the latter. But in both cases
English and American constitutionalism turns on the degree and nature of the separation of
powers and not, as believed by some, on its existence in the former and its non-existence in
the latter. K. WHEARE, supra note 20, at 25-28. See also M. VILE, supra note 5, at 18-19.
For a view that the concept of separated powers has little analytic utility other than as a
phrase meaning "limited government," see G. MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 97-124.
152. See notes 153-94 and accompanying text infra.
153. See generally C. HARDIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TOWARD
A NEW CONSTITUTION 1-9 (1974); H. HAZLITr, supra note 4; M. VILE, POLITICS IN THE
USA, supra note 3, at 143-218; THE PROSPECT FOR PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL Gov-
ERNMENT (A. Lepawsky ed. 1977).
154. S. FINER, COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 225 (1977).
155. Id.
156. See generally 1 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 92-204 (1889). As
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with its independent agencies and quasi-public bodies.' 57 "Thus the
federal government does not consist simply of three bodies which must
concur for an act of government to be sanctioned; it consists of many
more; and each one of these, by its refusal to concur, can veto the oper-
ations of all the others."'
158
This lack of executive and legislative central coordination and in-
ternal cohesion produces nonmajoritarian, and in a strict sense, un-
democratic, government.159 Each of the many scattered power centers
throughout the political system possess a liberum veto power. Each is
able to block the enactment of legislation it dislikes. Even proposals
with the support of large numbers of people in the executive and legis-
lative branches have, at times, tremendous difficulty in securing pas-
sage. 160 Many never do. "This arrangement, as already described, is
designed to stultify government-to enable one bit of the government
to say something different from-[another] bit and, whenever this oc-
curs, to prevent government as a whole from saying anything at all.'
16 1
Presidential government in the United States is not like cabinet govern-
ment-majority government-but instead something akin to "govern-
ment by minorities."'
162
Bagehot observed, Congress "is a body hanging on the verge of government." W. BAGEHOT,
supra note 134, at 53 (quoting Andrew Johnson).
157. See generally H. SEIDMAN, POLITICS POSITION AND POWER (1970). In Finer's
words, "[t]o call it the executive 'branch' is a misnomer. It is a congeries of thrones,
principalities and powers." S. FINER, supra note 154, at 250.
158. S. FINER, supra note 154, at 225.
159. See generally J. LIVELY, DEMOCRACY (1975).
160. See generally M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 18-22 (1966); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1971).
161. S. FINER, supra note 154, at 208.
162. Interest group domination of American government has become so pervasive that
one school of American political theory has found it necessary to redefine the concept of
"democracy", which traditionally meant majority rule, to mean "minorities rule." R. DAHL,
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132 (1956). In a conversation with the present writer,
the English political philosopher, the late Professor John Plamenatz, criticised Professor
Dahl's attempted redefinition of democracy. In Professor Plamenatz's view, the redefinition
seemingly was made to accommodate the nonmajoritarian nature of American government.
And if so, that rationale, in itself, did not make the definition correct. In his opinion, gov-
ernment by General Motors, AFL-CIO, Common Cause, Standard Oil and other such
groups is not democratic. See generally P. PLAMENATZ, DEMOCRACY AND ILLUSION 180-
212 (1977). Professor Plamenatz's familiarity with the majoritarian nature of cabinet gov-
ernment in his country, and its prominence in nearly every other western liberal-democracy,
see H. HAZLITT, supra note 4, at 159-62, may have led him to this conclusion and his reas-
sertion that democracy is "government by the consent of and responsible to the majority of
the governed." See P. PALMANTZ, supra, at 38-39, 69-70, 107-08, 194-95, 200.
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2. The Irresponsible Character of American Government
a. Unrestrained
The divisive, self-defeating nature of American government can-
not help but make it somewhat irresponsible. Its labyrinthian law-
making procedures defy total public control. Lord Bryce, the well-
known English historian of American life, already noted this fact in the
last century.
[T]he [American] nation does not always know how or where to
fix responsibility for misfeasance or neglect. The persons or bod-
ies concerned are so unrelated to one another that each can gen-
erally shift the burden of blame on someone else, and no one acts
under the full sense of direct responsibility [as one does in cabi-
net government]....
Lord Bryce's words ring true particularly in the modem era. In the
United States there is no centripetal organization like the cabinet to
concentrate and focus political responsibility.'64 No one agency of gov-
ernment is answerable, as a cabinet is, at an election [or to a legislature]
for official wrong or dereliction.165 Instead, American executive and
legislative powers are finely ground; their political authority is divided
amongst a manifold number of disconnected political entities. 66 This
diffusion of political authority permits each isolated unit of American
government to point the accusatory and exculpatory finger at another
unit for their mutual failure to cooperate in a legislative enterprise, and
thus to escape liability for the overall government of the nation. 67 In
such a situation, responsibility for government as a whole is necessarily
ambiguous. The voter is unable to assess adequately the accountability
of public servants. 68 With no one institution in charge of government,
the way a cabinet is, the voter cannot assign to any political entity the
responsibility of overall administration and in turn discipline it with his
ballot. 169 The voter can vote for part of the government some of the
time, but never for the whole government at any time.170 The most a
163. 1 J. BRYCE, supra note 156, at 287.
164. "They [the founders] divided the legislature from the executive so completely as to
make each not only independent, but weak even in its own proper sphere. The President
was debarred from carrying Congress along with him, as a popular prime minister may
carry Parliament in England, to effect some sweeping change .... He is forbidden to ap-
peal at a crisis from Congress to the country. . . Congress on the other hand was weak-
ened, as compared with the British Parliament in which one House has become dominant,
by its division into two co-equal houses, whose disagreement paralyzes legislative ac-
tion. . . ." Id. at 278.
165. See note 172, infra.
166. See note 152-94 and accompanying text infra.
167. See note 163 and accompanying text supra.
168. I. JENNINGs, supra note 134, at 475-76.
169. See id. See also, note 192 infra.
170. See id.
voter can do is disperse the disciplinary power of his franchise amongst
various political centers, dissipating what little control the voter exer-
cises over those who govern him.17 1 In this sense, American govern-
ment is irresponsible and not easily amenable to public control.
72
b. Unresponsive
Government in the United States is also irresponsible in another
sense. Its law-making procedures are notoriously unresponsive to the
meritorious claims of many minority groups, especially those tradition-
ally dispossessed by American society. 7 3 This is so because American
government is acutely susceptible to interest group pressures which
thwart the advancement of minority group proposals.174 The structure
of American government is "superbly adapted to the task of registering
and reflecting the interests and opinions of innumerable groups
throughout the country and of aggregating those interests in a way
which will facilitate the emergence of compromise policies. . . .,,i7
But all too often the law-making maze only is able to devise policies
which "represent the lowest common denominator of interested opin-
ion."I 76 Worse, perhaps, from the standpoint of traditionally disadvan-
taged minorities
171. See id. at 473.
172. "[W]ithout adequate power there can be no. . .responsibility, and if the power is
not concentrated and obvious to all, there can be neither the fixing nor the enforcement of
this responsibility." C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 14243
(1947). Where political power is diffused rather than concentrated, so too, is the public's
ability to control and discipline that power through its votes. The strength of the electoral
check, the most potent of all checks of govermnent power, is weakened and dissipated by its
dispersion among numerous disconnected elected officials. Hence, the Watergate affair, for
example, was an inevitable outcome of this unsatisfactory state. "In a parliamentary [sys-
tem] the troubles of Watergate could not have festered. This is partly because a parliament
would much earlier have questioned and harried and forced the resignation of a prime min-
ister (as it cannot question and harry and force the resignation of a head of state without
causing the sort of constitutional crisis in which America is now embroiled)." Wedding
Bells, THE ECONOMIST, November 17, 1973, at 13, col. 2. See also H. HAZLrrT, supra note
4, at 14-25; Levin, Liab'lity of the Prime Minister to the Court Process, 39 MANITOBA BAR
NEWS 143 (1972). But see P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 153-55
(1978). Professor Kurland suggests that cabinet government in the United States would not
have prevented Watergate. Id. In his opinion, "while it may be true that no other nation
utilizes our system of government, it cannot be said that any of these other governments
functions better than ours does." Id. at 154. He is probably alone in that view. See H.
HAZLITT, supra; Levin, supra; R. MENZIES, supra note 129 at-54. See also note 177 infra.
America is very badly governed. It has only been successful in avoiding ultimate political
crises through the resiliency of its people, the strength of its traditions, and its enormous
natural wealth.
173. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 18-22, 34-39.
174. Id.
175. M. VILE, supra note 3, at 270.
176. Id.
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is that the compromises which work so well in many fields are
potentially disastrous in those areas which demand coordinated
and continuous policies. The compromise politics of consensus
give to interested groups the opportunity to delay, and to modify
substantially the policies which eventually emerge. In this way
minorities defend themselves from attack, but at the same time
they gain the ability to veto effective action on behalf of other
minority groups. When confronted by a head-on clash of inter-
ests the political system instead of being able to resolve such con-
flicts can only shelve them. 1
77
With a myriad number of political units in the system able to veto
any legislative action, it is useless for a minority group to lobby only
one part of the government. It must not only try to ensure that all
parts of the government favor its endeavors, but that they do so simul-
taneously.179 Focusing attention on the executive branch does not
guarantee the same success that it generally does in cabinet govern-
ment.180 In cabinet government, "espousal of a proposal by the execu-
tive [cabinet] will have the support of the party's majority. . . and in
more than nine cases out of ten, therefore, to win over the minister or
civil servant is to win the campaign."'' In the United States, the polit-
ical system places such a premium on bargaining and compromise at so
many points in the law-making process, that major reform of the status
quo is rarely possible.'8 2 Reformers must lobby so many politicians
that only the groups which are the best organized and which have the
greatest amount of resources have any hope of success.' 83 Tradition-
ally oppressed minority groups are placed at an enormous disadvan-
177. Id. "This self-stultifying, divisive system of government indeed sometimes pro-
duces no movement or action at all; but, in the United States, this situation, where govern-
ment can grind to a halt and produce no action for a very long time, is not only tolerable but
often even agreeable, and in any case is usually irrelevant because the United States is, by
world standards, an empty country and a most wealthy one, so that the slowness with which
new measures may be introduced there does not bother the average U.S. citizen anything
like as much as it would bother his counterpart in the more crowded and considerably
poorer states of Europe." S. FINER, supra note 154, at 189. One wonders, of course, whether
this system of government will begin to bother Americans as their nation becomes more
densely populated and less rich. The current energy crisis suggests that it will.
178. S. FINER, supra note 154, at 248.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 249.
181. Id See generally C. HARDIN, supra note 153 at 119-41.
182. "There is an excessive friction in the American system, a waste of force in the strife
of various bodies and persons created to check and balance one another. There is a want of
executive unity, and therefore a possible want of executive vigour. Power is so much subdi-
vided that it is hard at a given moment to concentrate it for prompt and effective action. In
fact, this happens only when a distinct majority of the people are so clearly of one mind that
the several co-ordinate organs of government obey this majority, uniting their efforts to
serve its will." J. BRYCE, supra note 156, at 295-96.
183. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 18-22.
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tage.18 4 The sheer number of impediments to legislation presented by
the American law-making process effectively discourages them from
using it as a major tool in social reform." 5
c. Iliberal
American minority groups cannot at times impel the government
to act for their benefit, even when a large majority of people in the
executive and legislative branches wish to aid them, if other minorities
entrench themselves in key power centers to block the initiative.1
8 6
This much is clear from the experience of everyday government in the
United States. The political system is irresponsible however in still an-
other way. Since minority groups have problems moving government
to act when they have a majority of supporters backing them, it is not
surprising that they should find it even more difficult to do so when
they have only a minority of supporters and they seek legislation which
a majority of law-makers and the public dislike. 8 7 This occurs because
government in the United States is not designed to lead but to follow.
American government is perhaps too accurate a mirror of popular
views.' 8 Its political fragmentation causes each fragment of govern-
ment to ape the constituency it represents. 8 9 "Never mind if it reflects
public opinion more faithfully. . as its apologists contend, for that is
184. Id.
185. The social reform referred to in the text should not be taken to mean the product of
a particular ideology. Professor Cox may have had a particular ideology in mind when he
observed that the Warren Court responded to an intellectual impulse of egalitarianism, A.
Cox, supra note 70, at 36, which had perhaps been stymied by the law-making process. It is
abundantly clear, however, that reform of any character or ideology is extremely difficult in
the United States. The irresponsible and nonmajoritarian political process make it so. In an
editorial, a leading American magazine lamented about the problems involved in securing
economic reform: "Almost all legislators agree that the growth of Government spending
should be reduced, but many are unwilling to face the wrath of lobbies for old people,
veterans, civil servants and others.
"Lobbies that support capital-sapping Government regulations are equally potent and
vengeful. Big steelmakers, textile manufactuers and agribusiness interests put their political
muscle behind tariffs and import quotas. Wealthy shipowners lavish contributions on legis-
lators who support the Jones Act, which requires that U.S. flagships carry all cargo among
domestic ports ...
"It would seem suicidal for any political leader to challenge just a few of these groups,
let alone most of them. Yet the broad mass of Americans are wearying of inflation, regula-
tion, and budget busting. . . .In times of such ferment, the public may well be prepared to
accept fairly radical steps." Loeb, America's Capital Opportunity, TIME, April 2, 1979, at 49.
One wonders whether the American public is prepared for the radical political steps needed'
to set their government right so it can deal with national problems. See notes 188-94 and
accompanying text infra.
186. See notes 174-79 and accompanying text supra.
187. See A. Cox, supra note 70, at 35-36.
188. S. FINER, supra note 154, at 246.
189. Id.
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precisely its drawback. American society is too variegated for its reflec-
tion to be anything but diffuse and unfocused. . . . [I]t is like a win-
dow-pane which lets the sun's rays pass through it, where what is
needed is a burning glass." 190 Since American government is not a
very good filter of public opinion, government finds it unbearably pain-
ful to make unpopular political decisions.' 91 The tenets of liberal-de-
mocracy may command in some cases the protection of minorities from
the power of the majority.'92 But the American law-making process is
singularly inadept at providing minorities with that security.193 It is too
politically weak, and too easily apt to respond reflexively to the interest
groups which incessantly besiege it.
194
By contrast, cabinet government in Britain and the Common-
wealth is strong government. Its detachment from legislative squabbles
and from the often irrational political fray makes it a very attractive
political institution for minorities in particular to use.'9 -5 In Britain and
the Commonwealth minorities have only to persuade their cabinet to
employ its national law-making power for their benefit. 196 This is usu-
ally enough to effect unpopular reforms.1
97
Indeed, so ingrained is the belief that cabinet government is
quintessentially responsible government-responsible to minorities as
well as to majorities-that few people in Britain or the Commonwealth
think it necessary to have the courts enforce fundamental liberties.' 98
190. Id.
191. See note 185 supra.
192. See generally S. BENN & R. PETERS, supra note 42, at 211-32.
193. See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 18-22.
194. See notes 188-90 and accompanying text supra. "In 1958, a group of American
political scientists, deliberating on an outline of research for the study of pressure groups,
concluded that federalism and the separation of powers created decentralized parties and
legislative bodies 'less able to aggregate interests and protect themselves against interest pen-
etration than Cabinet-dominated parliaments. . . .' In the United Kingdom particularly, 'a
disciplined parliamentary party system . . . protects the legislative process from effective
interest group penetration ...
'A disciplined party system and a powerful executive [cabinet government] force inter-
est groups to direct their energies to the upper levels of the executive and the bureaucracy
where only moderate claims, well supported with technical information, become possible."'
C. HARDIN, supra note 153, at 134-35 (italics omitted).
195. See notes 269-72 and accompanying text infra.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. At present there is a fascinating debate in Canada which should interest American
constitutional scholars. The Canadians have been experimenting for the last 20 years with a
statutory Bill of Rights. See generally W. TARNAPOLSKY, THE CANADI .N BILL OF RIGHTS
(1966). Like the American Bill of Rights, the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c.
44, limits in a general way the exercise of governmental power. Despite the similarity of
language, though, the Canadian courts interpreting the statute have not concluded that their
Bill of Rights empowers them to annul laws which conflict with its provisions. See, e.g.,
Regina v. Gonzales, 32 D.L.R.2d 290 (1962). Indeed, the Gonzales case concluded that the
Since a cabinet is always answerable to the members of the legislature,
civil rights are guaranteed by the political process in ways in which
they are not in the United States. 199 Hence, the need exists in America
Bill of Rights enumerated only canons of construction and not fundamental prohibitions.
Id. at 292. According to the Gonzales court, the Bill was a mere statute and as such could
not be construed to detract from Parliament's primacy in the legislative field. Id. Therefore,
if the court found it possible to construe statutes to be consistent with the canons of the Bill
of Rights it would do so; if it could not, then Parliament's language would prevail. id.
Not anxious to deal with the question, the Canadian Supreme Court at first simply
avoided using the Bill of Rights to reach its decisions. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of
Rfightsfrom .Diefenbaker to Drybones, 17 McGILL L.J. 437, 442-43 (1971). It was not until
the now famous case of Regina v. Drybones, 9 D.L.Rt3d 473 (1970), that the court finally
confronted the issue. In Drybones the court, in a six to three judgment, declared part of a
federal law inoperative by reason of the Bill of Rights. The decision sparked substantial
controversy among Canadians about the proper role of their Supreme Court and the utility
of providing the Canadian courts with an "entrenched" non-statutory Bill of Rights. The
debate continues to the present day. Recently, at an Ottawa conference, Prime Minister
Trudeau failed yet again to persuade the 10 provincial premiers of Canada of the need for,
inter alia, an "entrenched" Bill of Rights. Short Sight, THE ECONOMIST, February 17, 1979,
at 76.
An American viewing this Canadian controversy would undoubtedly be at least mildly
surprised to discover that the recommendations for increased Canadian judicial review by
even the most persistent critics of the Canadian Supreme Court have been exceedingly mod-
est. See, e.g., P. WEILER, IN THE LAST RESORT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA (1974). With their southern neighbor's Supreme Court the leading
practitioner of the style ofjudicial review they seek to introduce into the Canadian political
system, one would expect them to look to the American judiciary for direction. They have
not. If anything, they have sought to ignore the experience of the American Supreme Court.
See, e.g., id.; Symposium, The Supreme Court of Canada, 1875-1975, 53 CAN. B. REV. 459,
459-714 (1975). Meanwhile their opponents have done their best to disseminate that record
as widely as possible. See, e.g., Willis, Book Review, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 274, 281 (1970).
Perhaps even more revealing was the recent spectacle of a Canadian Minister of Justice who,
in response to questions from members of the House of Commons, found it necessary to
reassure the House that his announced appointments to the Canadian Supreme Court were
not calculated to transform the court into an American one. McWhinney, supra note 98, at
906. Thus, from an American perspective the present debate about the proper extent and
nature of Canadian judicial review seems rather timid. Most Canadians are either strongly
opposed to the American style of judicial review, or favor a very modest version of it. See
generally 4 J. McRUER, ROYAL COMMISSION ENQUIRY INTO CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT No. 2,
at 1659-62 (1969).
Ignoring this debate (or perhaps reacting in an extremely sensitive manner to it), the
Canadian Supreme Court has now effectively abandoned its Drybones position.
Morgentaler v. The Queen, 53 D.L.R. 3d 161 (1975) (concerning substantive due process);
Attorney-General of Canada v. Canard, 52 D.L.R.3d 548 (1975) (concerning notions of
equal protection); Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell, 38 D.L.R.3d 481 (1973); Curr v.
The Queen, 26 D.L.R.3d 603 (1972). In doing so, the Justices have relied on reasons which
have not been entirely consistent with their rationale in Drybones. Tarnopolsky, The
Supreme Court and the Canadian Bill of Rights, 53 CAN. B. REy. 649, 654-74 (1975). But
underlying those reasons is perhaps a more fundamental worry: "The retreat from the posi-
tive position taken in Drybones,. . . [has been] accompanied by statements which indicate a
strong sense of judicial guilt at having tasted what is perceived as the forbidden fruit of
judicial supremacy." Lyon, supra note 91, at 57.
199. See notes 200-03 and accompanying text infra.
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for some body like the courts to enforce a bill of rights.
Sir Robert Menzies, one of Australia's most renowned prime min-
isters, described for an American audience why a formal bill of rights
was unnecessary in Australia:
There is a basic difference between the American system of gov-
ernment and the system of "responsible government" which ex-
ists in Great Britain and Australia. . . . [I]n Australia (and in
Great Britain) the Executive. . .is part of and directly responsi-
ble to the Legislature. With us, a Minister is not just a nominee
of the head of the Government. He is and must be a Member of
Parliament, elected as such, and answerable to Members of Par-
liament at every sitting. He is appointed by a Prime Minister
similarly elected and open to regular question. Should a Minister
do something which is thought to violate fundamental human
freedom he can be promptly brought to account in Parliament. If
his Government supports him, the Government may be attacked,
and if necessary defeated. And if that, as it normally would,
leads to a new General Election, the people will express their
judgment at the polling booths.
In short, responsible government in a democracy is regarded
by us as the ultimate guarantee of justice and individual
rights ...
In America, if I may say so as a most friendly observer, [ex-
ecutive officials] are not directly answerable in Congress, where
they do not sit, and in whose proceedings they are "outsiders," it
has been thought necessary to impose constitutional limits upon
them, with the Supreme Court as the interpreter of those lim-
its.2
0
Sir Owen Dixon, as Chief Justice of the Australian High Court, echoed
the same idea before a different group of Americans:
The men who drew up the Australian Constitution had the
American document before them; they studied it with care; they
even read the standard books of the day which undertook to ex-
pound it. They all lived, however, under a system of responsible
government. . . .They felt therefore impelled to make one great
change in adapting the American Constitution. Deeply as they
respected your institutions, they found themselves unable to ac-
cept the principle by which the executive government is made
independent of the legislature .... [Their] steadfast faith in re-
sponsible government . . . [as the surest guarantee of freedom
made such a principle objectionable.]
20 1
In the opinion of both Australians, cabinet government is the foremost
guarantee of protection for minorities because it coerces constitutional
behavior.20 2 Executives are encouraged to be tolerant by having to an-
200. R. MENZIES, supra note 129, at 54.
201. Id. at 52-53.
202. This is an opinion shared by at least one American, Mr. Justice Jackson: "I am a
swer constantly for their every official act, and ultimately by having to
answer to the public as a group for their joint performance. Since this
cannot happen in the United States, the courts must periodically inter-
vene to maintain notions of civility. In America, the Supreme Court is
usually thought to perform the function of educating society to use its
better instincts.203 In Britain, Canada and Australia, it is the political
process which performs this function. It is understandable then why in
America, where an irresponsible political system exists, minority
groups of all kinds seek refuge with the courts to protect themselves
from illiberal politicians.2"
D. The Reaction of American Courts to Presidential-Congressional
Government
1. The New Role of the American Courts
There is unmistakably a new mode of legal adjudication in the
United States. Professor Archibald Cox recently described it in this
way:
As nowhere else in the world, Americans have developed the ex-
traordinary habit of casting critical aspects of social, economic,
political and even philosophical questions into the form of ac-
tions at law and suits in equity so that courts-and ultimately the
Supreme Court of the United States-may participate in their
disposition.
That the Supreme Court has always played a partly political
role-that it has always made a certain amount of public policy
in some areas under the guise of interpreting the Constitution-is
all too obvious. That it has usually feltpartoy bound by "law" is
equally obvious to anyone who understands the self-discipline of
the legal method.
[However] [t]he past quarter century seems to me to have
brought dramatic changes not only in the weight of the political
components of constitutional decisions but also in the nature,
character, and extent of the judiciary's share of the overall busi-
ness of government. Taken all together these changes give con-
stitutional adjudication. . . new dimensions .... 205
fairly consistent reader of British newspapers. I have been repeatedly impressed with the
speed and certainty with which the slightest invasion of British individual freedom or minor-
ity rights by officials of government is picked up in Parliament, not merely by the opposition
but by the party in power, and made the subject of persistent questioning, criticism, and
sometimes rebuke. There is no waiting on the theory that the judges will take care of it." R.
JACKSON, supra note I11, at 81-82.
203. A. Cox, supra note 70, at 117.
204. See note 216 infra.
205. Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REv. 791,
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Indeed, so wide has the sweep of American judicial review become that
one very eminent English lawyer and scholar has called it somewhat
uncertainly both a "nightmare" and a "noble dream." °6
This new role has yet to be fully articulated into rules of law by the
courts, but a fair summary of the rules delineating the new role might
be as follows: The courts should exercise judicial power to substitute
their judgment for those of the political branches when either (1) a ma-
jority of the legislators, executives and/or the nation is unwilling to do
something which the moral dictates of liberal-democracy command
should be done in just societies, or (2) legislators and executives are
willing to do something which a majority of them and/or the nation
believes is desirable but cannot act because of institutional disabili-
ties.2"7 Naturally, these two standards are very unsuitable as formal
rules of law. They are extremely "political" in content, not at all simi-
lar to the ordinary rules of traditional legal method. This, of course,
explains why the courts have not yet promulgated them in this way.
Nevertheless, these rules express the underlying fundamental rationales
which inspire present day American courts to exercise their capacity for
judicial review.
In plain language and in view of earlier discussion here, the first
rule suggests that American courts must act because government in the
United States is irresponsible. 20 8 The second rule suggests that the
courts must act because government is nonmajoritarian.2 °9
2. Irresponsible Government: The Theoretical Just/cation for the New
Role
American constitutional theory insists, today mote than ever
before, that courts-particularly the United States Supreme Court-
must intervene to protect "minorities" from the irresponsible (unre-
strained, unresponsive, illiberal) American political process and ensure
justice for them.210 Recognition of this judicial responsibility first re-
ceived intellectual support from Chief Justice Harlan Stone in his now
famous footnote to the decision in United States v. Carolene Products
Co. :211
791-92 (1975).
206. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, II GEo. L. REv. 969, 971 (1977).
207. The distillation of these rules from the case law was done first by Professor William
Raymond Forrester. The author is grateful to him for having shared his inspiration with the
constitutional law class of which the author was a member.
208. See notes 163-94 and accompanying text supra.
209. See notes 153-64 and accompanying text supra.
210. See notes 163-94 and accompanying text supra.
211. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations [of exacting
judicial scrutiny] enter into the review of statutes directed at par-
ticular religious or national or racial minorities whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those politi-
cal processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
212
With this idea in mind, an entire school of American constitutional
learning began. It championed the use of the courts as a forum of last
resort for those with little political power to effect legislation in their
interests.213 Spurred by many Warren Court decisions, the notion
gained widespread respect and acceptance from judges and scholars in
a short time.2 14 Even the Burger Court has been obliged to support
it.215 Hence, today it forms the focal point from which American judi-
cial review derives its impetus.
At bottom, thd theor[y] assert[s] that the ultimate protection for
minorities, for spiritual liberty, and for freedom of expression,
political activity and other personal liberties comes nghtfully
from the judiciary. . . .[T]he political process, filled with arbi-
trary compromises and responsive, as in some degree it must be,
to short-run pressures, is inadequate to enforce the long-range
enduring values that often bespeak our aspirations instead of
merely reflecting our practices. The Warren Court thus came to
be influenced by an extremely self-conscious sense of judicial re-
sponsibility for the open and egalitarian operation of the political
system, for minorities, for the oppressed, and for a variety of
"rights" not adequately protected by the political process.
Professor Laurence Tribe has summarized this new view of the judicial
function in the preface to his treatise on constitutional law: "[T]he
212. Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted).
213. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, supra note 5, at 209-13; M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS OF
THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 1-49 (1964); M.
SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 34-39.
Professor Archibald Cox has criticized this overtly political approach to judicial review,
A. Cox, supra note 70, at 106-07, reluctantly admitting that though "[1]aw professors cannot
keep a myth [of the court's impartiality] alive if political scientists are able to expose the
fiction because of their greater candour or truer perception." Id. at 107.
214. See generally note 213 supra.
215. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
216. Cox, supra note 205, at 800. Professor Cox notes that a literal interpretation of the
Carolene Products footnote does not in itself explain many-Supreme Court decisions which
followed Chief Justice Stone's assertion of the theory. Id. at 797. This is true. The theory
did, however, stand generally for the protection of all minorities from nonmajoritarian poli-
tics. In this less narrowly literal sense it explains a good many more Supreme Court cases
than Professor Cox seems willing to admit.
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highest mission of the Supreme Court. .. is not to conserve judicial
credibility, but in the Constitution's own phrase, 'to form a more per-
fect Union' between right and rights within that charter's necessarily
evolutionary design."'2 ' 7 In other words, the first rule governing the
new role of the American courts exists to implement "the Constitution's
implicit vision of a just society" 218 through the Courts because the po-
litical branches often do not have a suitable vision of justice.2" 9
3. Nonmajoritarian Government: The Pragmatic Justjfcation for the New
Role
Beneath the theoretical layer of thought which justifies the new
role of the American courts lies, however, a more practical reason for
the role. It is a rationale embodied in the second rule governing the
current extended scope of constitutional adjudication in the United
States.22° If a majority of the government is willing to act, but cannot,
owing to its institutional disabilities, the courts must act in its stead.
Many examples could be given exhibiting the operation of this rule.
But it would be pointless to catalogue them here. Suffice it to note, as
Professor Louis Jaffe does, that in many cases
[tlhe initiative [for the state law reform] should have come from
state lawmaking agencies. It is the state legislatures which
[should have solved the problems]. . . .They did not do so. The
[Supreme] Court, faced with the enormity of our dereliction, has
gradually . . .assumed the initiative, taking upon itself the
lapsed responsibility.
221
The Federal Supreme Court has not been alone in assuming the lapsed
responsibility of Congress and state legislatures. The various state
supreme courts have also done their part to compensate for legislative
inaction.222 This has been necessary because even though a majority of
state citizens may in some cases want certain legal reforms, it is entirely
possible for the political system, through the operation of a
nonmajoritarian law-making process, to prevent their enactment.3
Justice Clark grudgingly confessed this in his concurring opinion in
Baker v. Carr:
224
I would not consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a
field [as reapportionment] if there were any other relief available
to the people of Tennessee. But the majority of thepeople of Ten-
217. L. TRIBE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (1978).
218. Id. at 13.
219. Id.
220. See notes 207-08 and accompanying text supra.
221. L. JAFFE, supra note 113, at 43-44.
222. See note 73 supra.
223. See notes 153-62 and accompanying text supra.
224. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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nessee have no 'practical opportunities for exerting their political
weight at the polls' to correct the existing 'invidious discrimina-
tion.'. . . The people have been rebuffed at the hands of the As-
sembly. . . . It is said that there is recourse in Congress and
perhaps that may be, but from a practical standpoint this is with-
out substance. To date Congress has never undertaken such a
task in any State.225
The intimation is clear. The American judiciary, led by the Supreme
Court, filled the legislative vacuum in the political system created by
the lethargic and largely impotent political branches. It seemingly had
no other choice. "[A] complex constitutional structure, . . . which
works only with extreme difficulty and slowness may place tremendous
pressures on the judiciary, and necessitate an acceptance by the judges
of prime responsibility for constitutional change. ' 2 2 6 Stated somewhat
more bluntly, the second rule governing American constitutional adju-
dication implies that "[where] the legislature [and executive are] supine,
judicial lawmaking is appropriate. 227
4 The New Role of the American Courts and American Constitutional
Theory
The new role of the American courts is inextricably bound up with
the constitutional theory of separated powers which Americans under-
stand.228 The American version of the separation of powers doctrine
provides legitimacy for the type of judicial review practiced by Ameri-
can courts. The doctrine does this with the following rationale: since
the American law-making process is undemocratic and irresponsible,
judicial review does not need to be either.229 If the courts are part of an
atomistic, anarchic system of competitive political power, they have the
legitimate right to exercise their power, however irresponsible and
nonmajoritarian that power may be, because all the other parts of the
political system exercise equally irresponsible and nonmajoritarian po-
litical power.230 Consequently it is axiomatic within the American po-
litical system that the courts exercise their power specifically to
counterbalance (check) the exercise of irresponsible and
nonmajoritarian political power by other political units in the sys-
tem.231
It is noteworthy, for the purposes of the discussion here, that both
225. Id. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
226. McWhinney, The Great Debate. Activism and Se/f-Restraint and Current Dilemmas
in Judicial Policy-Making, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 775, 792 (1958).
227. L. JAFFE, supra note 113, at 17.
228. See notes 116-27 and accompanying text supra.
229. See A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT-PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 164-65 (1962).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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rules which describe the new role of the American courts depend en-
tirely on one's theoretical and pragmatic perspective of the nature of
American politics. 232 For example, Justice Frankfurter never agreed
with Chief Justice Stone's theory of the proper judicial role expounded
in Carolene Products, nor did he agree with Justice Clark's pragmatic
view of the political situation in Baker v. Carr.23 3 He did not precisely
because he did not share their understanding of American government.
The divergence between Stone [and Clark, on one side] and
Frankfurter [on the other side] indicates disagreement as to the
kind of government the framers established and the relation of
the Courts thereto. Frankfurter thinks of the American system as
"popular." For him legislative supremacy and majority rule are
well-nigh inexorable commands. He is accustomed to draw Brit-
ish analogies and cite British decisions. But in America, unlike
Britain [and Canada and Australia], legislation cannot be equated
with the popular will. When contested legislation comes to the
Court for adjudication, it represents a popular will already de-
flected by various constitutional devices. . . . Legislation may be
the work of organized minorities, not unorganized majorities.
Judicial review does limit popular government. In this sense it is
oligarchal. But, in this respect, it is not distinguishable from
other undemocratic devices [of American government] such as
the presidential veto, the bicameral legislature, and other major-
ity-limiting [devices]. . . . [O]urs is a political system without a
model.234
Indeed, since it is such a unique political system, it has created a judi-
cial system which is also without model.
E. The Response of Presidential-Congressional Government to
American Judicial Review
Weak government has a dual peril. It cannot solve pressing na-
tional problems, nor can it prevent another part of the system from
trying to do so. The fragmentation and diffusion of political power in
the United States prevents the marshalling of cohesive majorities, ei-
ther inside the political branches or within the electorate, to effectively
oppose extensive judicial review by American courts. As academician
and journalist John Roche notes:
The power of the Supreme Court to invade the decision-
making arena, I submit, is a consequence of that fragmentation
of political power which is normal in the United States. No cohe-
sive majority, such as normally exists in Britain, would permit a
232. JUDICIAL REVIEW iii (Forte ed. 1968).
233. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
with United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
234. A. MASON, supra note 229, at 164-65 (emphasis added).
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politically irresponsible judiciary to usurp decision-making func-
tions, but, for complex social and institutional reasons, there are
few issues in the United States on which cohesive majorities exist.
The guerrilla warfare which usually rages between Congress and
the President, as well as the internal civil wars which are endemic
in both the legislature and the administration, give the judiciary
considerable room for maneuver.2 35
An English student of American politics, Professor M.J.C. Vile, con-
curs:
[T]he explanation of the Court's power is. . . to be seen in the
general context of the pluralist. . . system of the United States.
The Court is able to exercise its power because it rarely comes
squarely into conflict with a truly united opposition, either inside
or outside the formal institutional structure of government.236
Vile has elaborated on Roche's notion of how "cohesive majori-
ties" shape the role of judiciaries.237 By focusing in some detail on the
reasons for the levels of judicial review in Britain, Australia and
America, he distinguished between opposition to the courts from cohe-
sive majorities internal to the political branches, and opposition from
external electoral forces. 3 With regard to Britain, Vile opines that
even without the doctrine of legislative sovereignty, English judicial re-
view probably would still be minimal because of the apparent regular
coincidence of both political and electoral majorities.239 The legislative
majority in Britain reflects the electoral one and is thus a powerful de-
terrent to extensive judicial review. 4°
In Australia, as in Britain, cohesive legislative majorities ordina-
rily exist as a result of the disciplined party system enforced by the
operation of cabinet government. 241 They do not, however, always re-
flect cohesive public opinion. Vile suspects that the Australian federal
system, like the American one, disperses electoral attitudes, making
those attitudes susceptible to vargaries of locale rather than to a contin-
uous reenforcement of national legislative majorities.2 42 In this con-
text, then, the Australian High Court has had room to maneuver in the
exercise of judicial review and has done so much more frequently and
effectively than might otherwise be expected from a court so closely
235. J. ROCHE, SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE 203 (1964).
236. M. VILE, supra note 3, at 256-67.
237. Vile, Judicial Review and Politics in Australia, 51 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 386 (1957).
Professor Vile's reasons for the limited judicial review practiced by Australian courts also
explain the existence of limited judicial review in Canada. In both nations the operation of
cabinet government is a deterrent to extensive judicial review.
238. Id. at 387.
239. Id. at 391.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 387.
242. Id. at 388-90.
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attuned to English notions ofjudicial review.243 By comparison, in the
United States, the absence of cohesive legislative majorities is common.
There is no institution of cabinet government to structure them.244
Where they exist they rarely reflect cohesive electoral majorities.245 In
addition, as in Australia, cohesive public opinion is weakened by the
federal system.2 46 Therefore, by implication Vile suggests that judicial
review is demonstrably more extensive in the United States than in ei-
ther Britain or Australia.
2 47
The absence in the United States of cabinet government as found
in Britain, Canada and Australia, has been instrumental in preventing
the American political branches from coordinating opposition to exten-
sive judicial review. Without cabinet government to form "party gov-
ernment," the American party system has been left in a debilitated
condition. 48 In such a state, it has been unable to assist the political
branches in being an effective check on judicial power. As one Ameri-
can historian put it:
In perspective then, American [historical] experience sug-
gests that the success of judicial review of national policy varies
in close inverse relation to the efficacy of the political party sys-
tem. Or to put it differently, judicial "legislation" apparently
feeds on defects in the political structure. If, as some insist, pub-
lic opinion is important in the judicial process, it seems even
more important when implemented by dynamic and responsive
party machinery. The Supreme Court's only power is to per-
suade. Purse and sword are in other hands. But judicial persua-
siveness multiplies when political opposition is lacking or
disorganized. On the surface at least, Australian experience with
judicial review seems to teach the same lesson and by contrast so
243. Id. at 391.
244. Id. at 387.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 388-89.
247. See id. at 391. Professor Vile does not say this directly but seems to assume it
throughout his study.
248. Not all political scientists feel that the institution of cabinet government would nec-
essarily structure political opinion into "party government." According to some of them,
"what prevents legislative action by longer-lived majorities is not our formal constitutional
machinery, but the whole complex of the people's attitudes and the character that those
attitudes impose on our politics." A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEMOCRACY AND THE
AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 522 (1956). Another view, however, seems more convincing:
"Of course, attitudes shape institutions; but institutions also profoundly influence attitudes.
The framers of the American Constitution laid the groundwork for political institutions that
fragmented the electorate. . . By the same token, a centralizing change in American politi-
cal institutions [in the nature of cabinet government would] nourish a different set of atti-
tudes, and these, in turn, [would] encourage and support party government." C. HARDIN,
supra note 153, at 168. See also id. at 161-62. For examples of political institutions shaping
political attitudes, see P. WILLIAMS, POLITICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE 328-29 (2d ed. 1958)
and S. BEER & A. ULAM, PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT 414 (Beer & Ulam 2d ed., rev. 1968).
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does that of Great Britain.249
The federal system disorganizes political opinion in Australia; its ab-
sence strengthens it in Britain. But in both nations (as in Canada), cab-
inet government with its attendant cohesive legislative majorities
ensures that judicial review is limited. On the other hand, in the
United States the absence of cabinet government, coupled with a fed-
eral system, in practice relegate the political branches to the less than
equal role with respect to the courts. As a result, to use Sir Francis
Bacon's well known metaphor for the English judiciary of his time, the
American courts have not been "lions under the throne" but on it.250
F. The Reaction of British, Canadian and Australian Courts to Cabinet
Government
1. The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom the legislature is supreme, which explains
why English judges undertake less judicial review than their American
counterparts. 51 Parliament has the final word on any matter, so judges
in Britain simply cannot engage in the sort of judicial review practiced
in the United States.25z Moreover, the various philosophical and socio-
logical factors discussed earlier augment this tendency, causing the
judges to refrain from activism.2 53 These may not be the only reasons
for less English judicial review, however. Comparing the total law-
making capacity of the English political system (cabinet, Parliament
and the courts) with the total law-making capacity of the American
political system (President, Congress and the courts), one might per-
ceive another reason. Professor Louis Jaffe did.
It would seem that the English Parliament is potentially capable
of dealing with more of the country's law needs than are our leg-
islatures. If so, the demand for judicial lawmaking in England
may be to that extent less.
I conclude that the role of the English judge as lawmaker should
be more restricted than that of the American judge. Parliament is
better able to solve the country's legal problems than are the leg-
islatures of the United States. 54
249. Mendelson, JudicialReview andPary Politics, 12 VAND. L. REv. 447, 456-57 (1959).
The article is an historical study of the relationship between judicial review and political
parties in the United States.
250. "Let judges also remember that Salomon's throne was supported by lions on both
sides: let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne, being circumspect that they do not
check or oppose any points of sovereignty." FRANCis BACON: A SELECTION OF His WORKS
187-88 (S. Warhaft ed. 1965).
251. See notes 6-16 and accompanying text supra.
252. Id.
253. See notes 89-110 and accompanying text supra.
254. L. JAFE, supra note 113 at 69, 83.
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It is this governmental reality which encourages the higher degree of
judicial restraint in Britain, quite as much as Dicey's abstract doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty, its philosophical ramifications or the so-
ciological background of the judges who propound it.
2 Canada and Australia
Among the commonwealth states, the scope of judicial review in
Canada and Australia has been closest to the American model.2 5 This
similarity, though, has not prevented judges in both nations from exer-
cising extreme restraint in reviewing executive and legislative acts.
2 5 6
They exercise restraint even though they possess the capacity to declare
what the law is according to their respective constitutions, and to pro-
tect those decisions from legislative circumvention. 7 Several explana-
tions have been offered for why Canadian and Australian judges are
less active than their American counterparts. The influence of Dicey
and the lawyers and scholars reared in his constitutional theory, the
differences in national history and legal philosophy, the diverse juris-
dictional ambits of the highest courts, and the character of judicial per-
sonnel cannot be easily discounted.25 8 But they are not the complete
answer.
The institutions of government in the United States, Canada and
Australia are crucially different. 259 This difference of cabinet govern-
ment in Canada and Australia and of presidential-congressional gov-
ernment in the United States, accounts in no small measure for the
submissive role of Canadian and Australian courts and the vastly more
assertive role of the American courts.260 The political branches shape
the behavior of the judiciary. And the strength of the judiciary vanes
inversely with the ability of the government branches to act. Experi-
ence in Canada and Australia repeatedly indicates this is so. 261 An ex-
255. See notes 17-38 and accompanying text supra.
256. See notes 39-62 and accompanying text supra.
257. See notes 17-38 and accompanying text supra.
258. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
259. See notes 153-64 and accompanying text supra. One commentator noted: "The
British House of Lords, the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada [as well as the Australian High Court] ... [have] fundamental differences at the heart
of their operations. On reflection, this should not be so surprising; we also find significant
differences in the legislative institutions in these. . . countries." P. WELtER, supra note 198,
at 6 (italics omitted).
260. See notes 163-72 and accompanying text supra.
261. The ability of cabinet government to resolve national problems is best illustrated by
examples of national legislation enacted in Britain, Canada and Australia which would be
extremely difficult to enact in the United States because of the numerous political road-
blocks in the American law-making process. See CAN. REV. STAT., Can. Criminal Code
(1970) (of a single criminal code in Canada); G. CARTER, supra note 3 at 146-50 (regarding
the reorganization of local government accomplished in Britain in 1971); R. LuMB & K.
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ecutive cabinet supported by a majority of followers in the legislature is
a much more majoritarian and responsible government than any
American administration imaginable. Being so, the cabinet is more re-
sponsive to majoritarian demands for reform. It is also more responsi-
ble to minorities in its perceptions of proper public policy z62 In both
Canada and Australia cabinet government is thus more sensitive to the
interests of both majority and minority.
263
Several recent cases and legal comments in Canada and Australia
confirm the correctness of this view. In the decision of Attorney-General
for Australia v. Commonwealth of Australia,2 4 the Australian High
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Barwich, rejected various Amer-
ican reapportionment precedents squarely applicable to the case before
it.265 In doing so, the court upheld a parliamentary act which appor-
tioned electoral seats largely according to non-population factors. The
Chief Justice gave this reason for ignoring American judicial prece-
dent:
Further, it must always be borne in mind that the American
colonies had not only made unilateral declarations of indepen-
dence but had done so in revolt against British institutions and
methods of government. The concepts of the sovereignty of Par-
liament and of ministerial responsibility were rejected in the for-
mation of the American Constitution. Thus, not only does the
American Constitution provide for a presidential system, but it
provides for checks and balances based on the denial of complete
confidence in any single arm of government.
[U]nlike the case of the American Constitution, the Austra-
lian Constitution is premised upon a parliamentary government
with ministerial responsibility.
The contrast in constitutional approach is that, in the case of
the American Constitution, restriction on legislative power is
sought and readily implied whereas, where confidence in the Par-
liament prevails, express words are regarded as necessary to war-
rant a limitation of otherwise plenary powers. Thus, discretions
in Parliament are more readily accepted [b this Court] in the
construction of the Australian Constitution.
66
In Chief Justice Barwich's opinion the differences between the institu-
tional structure of government in Australia and in the United States
RYAN, supra note 17, at 14 (the creation of a national commission to supervise the utilization
of waters from rivers that border states in Australia).
262. See notes 163-72 and accompanying text supra.
263. Id.
264. 7 Austl. L.R. 593 (1975).
265. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
266. 7 Austl. L.R. at 605-06.
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warranted the Australian High Court's deference to its legislature. It
did so, according to Barwich, precisely because the Australian govern-
ment structure reposes confidence in a single arm of government-Par-
liament as it operates through the cabinet-whereas the American
government structure does not.
Canadian Professor J.R. Mallory, echoing this thought, notes that
the same could be said for Canada:
[The role of the Canadian Supreme Court] has been modest,
partly for reasons which may be peculiar to the times, but partly
also I think for reasons which bear on the nature of the Canadian
political system. These reasons include. . . the nature of the bal-
ance between the courts and other branches of government as
they are perceived in a parliamentary, as distinct from a congres-
sional system.
Canadian constitutional arrangements are sufficiently different
from those of the United States that the role of the courts in the
constitution is bound to be different and more modest.267
This is certainly also the opinion of at least one Justice of the Canadian
Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Dickson compared the position of his
court in the Canadian political system with that of the American
Supreme Court in the American political system and concluded:
When you speak of the United States Supreme Court, it is
also essential to recognize the very different United States consti-
tutional set-up. The judiciary is part of a system of checks and
balances. . . . It is not a case of deciding whether they are going
to be creative; that is their undoubted right and duty. . . . We
are not in the same situation from a constitutional point of
view.
26 8
Two Canadian legal sholars have provided an insight into why
government structure is such a crucial feature in determining the level
of judicial review in their country. Writing about the Canadian
Supreme Court's refusal in Attorney-General of Canada 1'. LavellI69 to
invoke the "equality" provision of the Canadian Bill of Rights to
render inoperative discriminatory legislation, Professor Kerr adjudged
that it was unnecessary for the Court to have intervened. 70 The Court
could avoid intervention into the policy-making sphere because, in his
view,
[t]he remedial powers of the legislature are a major advantage to
the use of legislative reform in preference to judicial reform.
267. Mallory, Constraints on the Courts as,4gencies of Constitutional Change- The Cana-
dian Case, 1977 PUB. L. 406, 418, 427.
268. THE CANADIAN JUDICIARY 84 (A. Linden ed. 1976).
269. 38 D.L.R. 3d 481 (1973).
270. Kerr, The Canadian Bill of Rights and Sex-Based Dfferentials in Canadian Federal
Law, 12 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 357, 387 (1974).
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More importantly, under the Canadian legislative system [in
stark contrast to the American legislative system] the chances of
obtaining legislative reform are reasonable. Because the Cabinet
controls the votes of its party supporters in the legislature, one
has achieved a major task in the implementation of a reform by
convincing the cabinet of the need for it.2 7
Another Canadian writer, in his response to an American law profes-
sor's suggestion that the Canadian judiciary undertake a more creative
role like the role of the American judiciary, stated even more forcefully
why extensive judicial review was unnecessary in Canada:
[W]e [Canadians] should seriously question whether legal institu-
tions and remedies, whether existing or yet to be created, are the
most effective way to achieve social change in this society.
We might note in this regard that our reforms in landlord-
tenant law came through the legislature. Our proposed Spadina
expressway was halted by the cabinet. The federal government
suspended urban renewal, old style. It is of interest to note that
the Ontario government is ...suing the U.S. Dow Chemical
[Co.] for damages for allegedly polluting Lake Ontario. It could
be that the Canadian political system is sufficiently sensitive to
social injustice to provide an avenue of change more effective
than that of its U.S. counterpart.272
What can be said of the Canadian political system can equally be said
of the Australian and British political systems. Where government is
majoritarian and responsible, judicial law-making is unnecessary.
G. The Response of Cabinet Government to Judicial Review in Britain,
Canada and Australia
Courts in Britain, Canada and Australia, by and large, have es-
caped the sort of controversy which has embroiled the American judici-
ary throughout its history. In England, courts are subordinate bodies
to the legislature, and by being so they have not had to be responsible
for the "last word." Criticism of public policy has therefore been di-
rected at Parliament, and the courts have been spared much adverse
271. Id.
272. Comment by J. Jowell in LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 34 (J. Ziegel ed. 1973). Per-
haps more expressive of Canadian feelings toward this suggestion is Mr. Jowell's humor:
"However, as we are becoming increasingly sure of our capacity to stake an alternative in
our own image, Professor Friedman detracts from our growing certainty by telling us that
the 'creative disrupters' in the U.S. . . .represent a legal avant-garde. The implication we
draw from this is both that things in the U.S. are more hopeful than we had assumed and
that their methods might well (yet again) prove to be a model for us.
"As we look south and see the spectre of [advocates of this legal avant-garde] marching
across our borders, some might react in the same way that Oscar Wilde did when first shown
the Niagara Falls. 'Very impressive,' he said, 'but wouldn't it be more impressive if it went
the other way?"' Id. at 34.
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attention.
273
Canadian and Australian courts have not been in such a privileged
position. In the process of interpreting their respective constitutions,
they, at times, have used their ultra vires powers to annul important
legislative acts.274 This has not always been accomplished without
arousing critical responses and attempts to circumvent their deci-
sions.275 But Canadian and Australian governments have not found it
necessary to reassert their authority. It has been unnecessary for obvi-
273. "The example of the Supreme Court of the United States of America shows that if
we [English] want to keep politics out of the administration of justice, we must deprive the
officials who administer justice of all discretion which might be influenced by political con-
siderations. Else there will be an incentive for politicians to attempt to 'pack' the courts with
their own partisans. But where the ultimate authority is a non-judicial court or assembly, all
we need to ensure when selecting people to be judges is that they shall faithfully apply the
laws enacted by the Legislature in all cases to which they clearly apply. It was not necessary
to pack the English Bench because the same judges who decided the Taff Vale case could be
relied upon, whatever their political opinions or private views, to apply the provisions to the
Trades Disputes Act, which reversed the Taff Vale decision. Provided the judges, like reeds,
will bow to political winds in due legislative form, there is no reason for them not to exer-
cise, in the absence of a clear directive from Parliament, their own judgment on what is
equitable and just. All that we do demand is that where Parliament has given a ruling,
judges should follow it, even against their own judgment, not because Parliament is wiser,
more equitable or more just than the judges, but. . . because it is expedient to concentrate
all political discretion in Parliament, where, though wrong may be done, it will be done
openly." J. LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 217-18 (1966). Of course, this is not to say
that English courts are immune from criticism. The power of statutory interpretation is not
an insignificant one, nor is its exercise by judges possible without also the exercise of some
political discretion. See J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 175-216 (1977).
Criticism of the courts, however, is directly related to the degree of political discretion exer-
cisable by judges. The less discretion they have, the less useful it will be to disparage them.
Thus, the English courts, by possessing only the capacity to interpret "narrowly drawn"
statutes, rather than "broadly written" constitutions, are required to confine their subjective
judgments to the interstices of legislation. Hence, their judgments cause much less contro-
versy than those of American, Canadian or Australian courts, who, by possessing the power
to make definitive interpretations of their constitutions, have free rein to interpolate their
subjective judgments into the molar regions of the law.
274. E.g., Australian Communist Party v. The Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. 1 (1951)
(where a law dissolving the Australian Communist Party was held ultra i/res the constitu-
tion); Bank of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth, 76 C.L.R. 1 (1948) (where the
government's attempted nationalization of the bank was declared to be beyond the legisla-
tive powers given it by the Australian constitution). In addition, a number of Canadian laws
dealing with economic and social matters were held invalid by the Privy Council between
1896 and 1949. E. MCWHINNEY, supra note 2, at 67 n.27.
275. The Australian government made an attempt to amend the Australian constitution
to reverse the High Court's invalidation of the law dissolving the Communist Party. But the
voters rejected the amendment at a referendum. Vile, supra note 237, at 389. "New Deal"
legislation held invalid in Canada by the Privy Council was partly reenacted after the Cana-
dian federal government (pursuant to an agreement with the provincial governments) re-
quested the British government to legislate an amendment to the Canadian Constitution
empowering the federal government to enact the legislation. F. SCOTT, ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION 90-101, 369-70 (1977).
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ous reasons. Cabinet government is able to command the support of a
majority in the legislature. Thus it is capable of nearly instantaneous
action to reverse judicial judgments resting on nonconstitutional
grounds. This support also allows the cabinet expeditiously to enact
legislative proposals that could curb court powers. The awareness that
such proposals are possible and easily implemented is undoubtedly
enough to give courts pause before rendering judgments on constitu-
tional grounds which are flagrantly in opposition to cabinet opinion.27 6
No doubt, as long as the Australian High Court and the Canadian
Supreme Court exercise their ultra vires powers selectively and care-
fully, and continue to couch their approach to legal issues in methods
of analysis avowedly legalistic in style, there will be few vindictive cries
of "pack the courts" even when legislation is annulled.277 Should the
situation change, though, one can be sure that the Australian and Ca-
nadian governments will be able to account for themselves in any
struggle with their judicial branches.
Conclusion
Professor Eugene Rostow inadvertently, and surely unwittingly,
summed up this note's thesis in a passage from his book, The Sovereign
Prerogative. While defending the American style of judicial review,
and advocating an even more extensive role for American courts than
practiced at the time of his writing, he alleged that it was useless for
American scholars to clamor for law-making only by the political
branches and not by the courts because "[t]he Constitution of the
United States does not establish a parliamentary government, and at-
tets to interpret American government in a parliamentary perspective
[by advocating a limited judicial role] break down in confusion or ab-
surdity. ' 2 78 He could not have been more correct in his analysis of the
problem. 279
Disagreement among scholars who desire an expansive role for the
courts and those who prefer a lesser one typically occurs because of
their different views of the political context within which American ju-211
dicial review takes place. Since this is so, it only confirms the analy-
sis in this note. The major cause of extensive American judicial review
276. "As Canadian Professor Peter Russell [has noted,] 'The [Canadian Supreme]
Court's hesitant treatment of the Bill of Rights [see note 198 supra] does not necessarily
signify a modest abdication of judicial power, it may well reflect a shrewd instinct for the
conservation of judicial authority."' Mallory, supra note 267, at 426.
277. See note 84 supra.
278. E. RosTow, supra note 76, at 148-49.
279. But he could not have been more incorrect about its solution-greater judicial in-
volvement in politics.
280. See note 229 supra.
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does not lie with the courts themselves, but rather with the political
branches of government. It is sensible, then, to believe that when
American government is made more majoritarian and responsible,
those who currently desire extensive judicial review will come to favor
less of it. There will simply be less reason or justification for them to
desire a large judicial role. This is the only means by which advocacy
of judicial self-restraint will be made legitimate.
The answer, of course, is not the wholesale adoption of cabinet
government in the United States at all levels of the political process.
Such a solution, however desirable in an ideal world, is not a likely
alternative for the near future. What is needed are institutional re-
forms which duplicate the effect of cabinet government. 2Sl To accom-
plish this end will require a reevaluation and restructuring of American
constitutional theory and politics. But this is not beyond the capacity
of Americans to appreciate. Indeed, such reforms will be necessary be-
cause, in Justice Jackson's words, "[t]he future of the [American
281. Suggestions for reforms to produce this effect abound. See generally C. HARDIN,
supra note 153, at 182-97; H. HAZLITT, supra note 4, at 30-36. More interesting, perhaps, is
Professor Vile's proposal, which would not require constitutional amendment. THE PROS-
PECT FOR PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 153, at 59-62. Accord-
ing to Vile, the present defect in the American law-making process is the extreme division of
the executive from the legislature. To remedy this problem, he urges that the chief executive
take his government into the legislature. If the chief executive and his cabinet were able to
sit in the legislature, answer questions, participate in debates and lobby legislators, much of
the present isolation and discoordination of the two branches might be alleviated. Vile's
proposal violates no principle of separation of powers, see note 143 supra, nor does it require
formal amendment of the Constitution to permit certain executive officers also to be mem-
bers of the legislature. All that it requires is an invitation by the legislature to the executive
to join with them in their common endeavor.
Of course, the number and character of the reforms one wants depends largely on how
serious one deems the present American situation to be. It is the present % riter's belief that
the American law-making process is badly in need of reform. Its condition is inherently
divisive and unstable. It tends to produce either impotent government, or something poten-
tially worse, government byjudges. Therefore, there should be careful consideration of cab-
inet government (which not surprisingly is the method of large scale business organization
most frequently employed by Americans) and how its features might be duplicated, particu-
larly by states and local authorities. State and local government have always been the
source of institutional experimentation in the American federal system.
If this suggestion is thought to be unrealistic, so too, no doubt, were the progressive era
reforms of American government: "[i]t is difficult to have much patience with this sort of
objection. It is not an argument; it is simply the expression of a paralyzing fatalism. It helps
to perpetuate the very condition it affects to deplore. The American people will compel a
change to the cabinet form of government the moment they are actively convinced of the
necessity for it. Those who are convinced that this change is imperative must try to persuade
their fellow citizens." H. HAZLITT, supra note 4, at 48. It is the obligation of law professors
and political scientists as well as that of politicians to study the problem more carefully than
they have done, to come to their own conclusions and if convinced of the need for reform, to
engage themselves more actively than they otherwise have to accomplish that end.
Supreme] Court [as well as that of the entire judiciary] may depend
more upon the competence of the executive and legislative branches of
government to solve their problems adequately and in time that upon
any merit which is its own."
'2 82
282. R. JACKSON, supra note 111, at 83.
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